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Brian Levy analyzes different types of con-  In Sri Lanka, heavy formal tax and regulatory
straints on the participation of small and  obligations are imposed only on larger firms.
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the econo-  Reform priorities there should be to reduce
mies of Sri Lanka and Tanzania.  He concludes  these disincentives to finns achieving fornal
that:  status and to broaden (but not to the point of
universality) the reach of the tax and
* The type and severity of constraints vary  regulatory apparatus.
between the two countries:
In Tanzania, heavy tax and regulatory
Lack of access to finance is the binding  requirements are imposed on all firms, albeit
nonprice constraint on the expansion of all  with pervasive lubrication and renegotiation of
SMEs in Tanzania, and on smaller, less-  formal obligations.  There the reforn  priority
established firms in Sri Lanka.  should be to exempt the smallest enterprises
entirely from regulatory and tax obligations
In Tanzania, tax and regulatory burdens am  and to introduce more transparent
the next heaviest constraint on all SMEs.  In  administrative procedures.
Sri Lanka, the smallest, least-established
enterprises maintain an informal status outside  *  Underdeveloped arm's-length markets for
the regulatory web. Larger, established Sri  intermediate inputs constrain the participation of
Lankan SMEs are inhibited by a host of  SMEs. A prime cause of such market weakness
nonprice constraints, no one of which is  is vertically integrated production by state-
dominant.  owned enterprises, even where there is no
economic rationale for such integration. A
Tanzania's formal and informal financial  challenge for privatization is to distinguish
systems for SMEs are weak.  Sri Lanka's finan-  between those sectors where vertical integration
cial system for SMEs functions weUl;  firms for  is efficient and should be maintained when state-
which financing is limited are those to which  owned enterprises are privatized and those where
lending would be imprudent.  A key policy  the vertical structure should be broken up,
question is whether targeted credit should be  allowing morc opportunities for SMEs to parnici-
used to accelerate SMEs' access to formal  pate.
financial institutions (such a World Bank pro-
gram was important for Sri Lanka's success) and  * Educated entrepreneurs in established SMEs
whether banks should use their SME lending  that serve high-quality market niches (but not
apparatus to make loans to microenterprises  uneducated entrepreneurs serving simpler
(which even in Sri Lanka are denied access to  markets) perceive limits in enterprise and
formal finance).  economywide technical and marketing capabili-
ties as significantly constraining expansion.  It
* Regulation inhibits the expansion of SMEs  remains uncertain whether the weakness of
in quite different ways in the two countries:  support systems signals an underlying market
imperfection that only government intervention
can overcome.
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and  Lelia  Webster for  thelr  helpful  comments.OBSTACLES  TO THE  DEVEL'IMENT  OF INDIGENOUS  SHALL  AND  MEDIUM  ENTERPRISES:
AN EMPIRICAL  ASSESSMENT
I: SOME  PRELIMINARIES
The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to report  the  results  of  micro-level
field  research  conducted  in late  1989  and  earl7  1990  of constraints
confronting  small  and  medium  enterprises  (SMEs)  in  Sri  Lanka  and  Tanzania,l
and  to analyze  the  implications  of these  results  for  reforms  to promote  the
development  of an  efficient  indigenous  private  sector  in  LDCs.  In doing  so,
an effort  will  be made to lay  out  the  empirical  methodology  in sufficient
detail  to facilitate  parallel  studies  in  other  countries  where  there  might  be
some  interest  in assessing  obstacles  to SME  development.
I.1  Structural  Adjustment,  Micro  Constraints,  and  SME  Participation
Among  the  many lessons  that  have  begun  to emerge  with the
accumulation  of experience  in  programs  of structural  adjustment,  two  are
central  to the  present  paper. First,  it  has increasingly  become  apparent  that
programs  of reform  that  eliminate  macro-economic  imbalances,  bring  overvalued
exchange  rates  closer  to equilibrium,  and  promote  pricing  on the  basis  of
market  signals  and  opportunity  costs  are  not  necessarily  sufficient  to ease
the  constraints  on development.  In some  countries,  rather  than  securing  a
1 The research  served  as inputs  for  Tanzania Country  Economic  Memorandum
(1990)  and  Sri  Lanka:  Country  Economic  Memorandum  (1990).  Preliminary  papers
that  provide  the  results  of the  analyses  for  each  country  in  more detail  than
is  provided  heti are  available  upon  request.-2-
rapid  and  sustained  supply  response,  these  Lroad  macro  and incentive  reforms
have  brought  to the  forefront  a  whole  new set  of constraints  that inhibit  the
response  of the  private  sector. Further,  as the  analysis  of Sri  Lanka  and
Tanzania  underscore  many  of these  newly  evident  constraints  are  microeconomic
and inst'.tutional  in character,  and  so do  not lend  themselves  to the familiar
analytical  techniques  and  policy  remedies  of their  macro-economic
counterparts.
Second,  in  many  countries  the  move towards  liberal  economic
policies  has brought  to the  forefront  the  .:ole  of SMEs.  In part,  this
heightened  attention  reflects  the  greater  opportunities  open  to SMEs  in a
liberal  environment:  in  practice  (if  not  necessarily  by design),  large
incumbent  public  and  private  firms  tend  to  be favored  wherever  there  are
strict  direct  controls  over  economic  activity  and  rationed  access  to foreign
exchange  or credit. So  policies  that  shift  from  direct  control  and  rationed
access to market allocation result in a significant  reduction of
discrimination  against  SMEs. In part,  also,  there  is growing  recognition  that
small  enterprises,  especially  microenterprises  with fewer  than  five  workers,
can  provide  a  welfare  net  to alleviate  the  burden  of  poverty  for  people  with
no foothold  in the  established  public  or private  sectors. More fundamentally,
there  is growing  interest  --  both for  narrowly  economic  reasons  and for
broader  reasons  of political  economy  --  in  the  potential  for  SMEs  to serve  as
dynamic  agents  of economic  development.  As the  experiences  of Taiwan  and
(more  recently)  Thailand  and  Indonesia  reveal,  SMEs  hold  the  promise  of
building  development  incrementally  on existing  national  capabilities,  and
providing  a seedbed  for  the  emergence  of dynamic  and  efficient  larger  national
firms  even  as they  support  a competitive  market  environment. Further,  there-3-
is  some  indication  that  development  via the  expansion  and  proliferation  of
SMEs  holds  the  promise  of contributing  to  equitable  economic  expansion, 2 in
part  by inhibiting  collusive,  rent-seeking  actions  by government  officials  and
powerful  incumbents.  For  all  of these  reasons,  enhancing  SMEs  is  high on the
agenda  of  both government  officials  and  Bank staff  active  in  Sri  Lanka  and
Tanzania  --  the  two  countries  that  are  the  subject  of the  present  study.
After  failed  experiments  with thoroughgoing  state  control  of
economic  activity  and  widespread  public  ownership,  both  Sri  Lanka  and  Tanzania
have  moved  --  albe't  at quite  different  speeds,  and  with  very  varying  degrees
of enthusiasm  --  towards  more liberal  economic  policies  and  more reliance  on
the  private  sector. Policy  reforms  were initiated  in Sri  Lanka  in 1977,  ard
by 1990  the  embrace  of liberal,  pro-private  sector  policies  was  virtually
complete;  even  so,  as  we shall  see,  Sri  Lankan  SMEs  continue  to labor  under
constraints  that  are  residues  of the  pre-reform  pattern  of economic
organization.  By contrast,  policy  reforms  in  Tanzania  began  only in 1984,  and
proceeded  only  haltingly,  with little  evidelLce  even  by early  1990  of any
increase  in  momentum. Yet  for  all  of the  limitations,  Tanzania's  reforms  did
remove  at least  some  binding  constraints  --  most  notably  constraints  in  access
to foreign  exchange  and  imported  inputs  --  and  thereby  facilitated  a surge  in
SME  activity. Together,  analysis  of SME  participation  in  the  two  countries
can  thus  provide  some  indication  of the  kinds  of  constraints  SMEs  are  likely
to face  at  varying  stages  in  the  transition  from  highly  distorted  towards
2. Thus,  in the  course  of the  1970s,  the  Gini  coefficient  for  Taiwan  fell
from  0.38  to 0.33;  Fee  John  Fei,  Gustav  Ranis,  and  Shirley  Kuo,  Growth  with
Equity:  The  Taiwan  Case,  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1979).
r 's-4-
liberal  economic  policies. 3
1.2  The  Empirical  Approach
Firm-level  interviews  were  used to learn  from  SMEs  themselves  how
the  relevant  public  and  private  institutions  (including  markets)  with  which
they  interact  operate  in  practice,  and  their  relative  severity  as constraints
on enterprise  operation  and  expansion. All interviews  combined  open-ended  and
survey  approaches,  with the  open-ended  approach given  special  prominence  in
early  interviews;  interview  protocols  (revised  after  the initial  round  of
interviews)  were  used --  an  example  is  included  in  Annex  A  --  both  to guide
the  discussion  and  to  provide  a  basis  for  subsequent  quantitative  analysis.
Rather  than  interview  broadly  across  the  spectrum  of activities  in
which  SMEs  operate,  in each  country  the  surveys  focused  on a narrow  group  of
subsectors  wihich  had some  potential  for  comparative  advantage,  where  entry  was
possible  at the smallest  scale,  and  where  enterprises  could  expand
incrementally  to quite  large  size. This  subsectoral  approach  facilitates  the
acquisitior  of a reasonably  in-depth  understanding  of the  context  in  which the
SMEs  operate,  and  thereby  enables  the  interviewer  to  penetrate  beyond
superficial  responses. The  risk  is  that  subsectoral  results  from relatively
small  samples  might  fail  to  provide  a firm  basis  for  broader  generalization
with sharp  differences  from  sector  to sector  in  the  character  of the
constraints.  A priori,  constraints  associated  with imperfections  in the
3  While  Sri  Lanka  has  beer.  subjected  to intermittent  civil  unrest  since
1983,  the  economic  center  of Colombo  largely  has  been  unaffected. Indeed,  as
the  empirical  reaults  below  confirm,  this  unrest  is  not  viewed  by SMEs  active
in the  Colombo  area  as an important  constraint  on their  expansion.market  for  finance  and  with regulations  that  have  broad  application  are likely
to  be similar  across  sectors;  by contrast,  input,  technical  and  marketing
constraints  (as  well as  constraints  assoc.ated  with sector-specific
regulations)  cre  likely  to be specific  to individual  subsectors.
In an effort  to  balance  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of sub-
sectoral  and  broad-based  approaches,  interviews  were conducted  in  three
subsectors  in  each  country  --  furniture,  construction  and  horticulture  in
Tanzania,  and  leather  products,  ceramics  and  gemstone  calibration  in Sri
Lanka. In one  subsector  in  each  country  (furniture  in  Tanzania,  and leather
products  in  Sri  Lanka),  the  enterprise  sample  was large  enough  to permit
careful  quantitative  analysis. Analysis  in the  remaining  two subsectors  was
qualitative,  with the  objective  of exploring  whether  the  quantitative  findings
were reletant  more broadly. Financial  and (non-sector-specific)  regulatory
constraints  indeed  turned  out  to have  similar  impacts  across  sectors. So  what
follows  focuses  iargely  on the  furniture  and  leather  products  sectors,  with
some  reference  to the  other  subsectors  for  those  constraints  th.  .arned  out
to  be subsector  specific  in  their  impact.
Leather  products  in  Sri  Lanka. As of  mid 1990,  Sri  Lanka's
leather  industry  comprised  a diverse  array  of participants  both  upstream  and
downstream.  Upstream,  there  were a  dozen  or so  tanners,  with the  state-owned
Leather  Corporation  (which  accounts  for  about  35Z  of the  11  million  square
feet  of leather  tanned  each  year  in Sri  Lanka)  the  largest,  folloted  by two
relatively  large  (together  accounting  for  an additional  35?),  and  an
additional  nine  or so  smaller  private  firms. Downstream,  the  bulk  of activity
was in the  production  of footwear  for  the  local  market,  with three  majorproducers  (the  multinational  enterprise  Bata,  a downstre-m  division  of the
Leather  Corporation,  and  a private  Sri  Lankan  firm),  some  medium-sized
enterprises  (some  of  whom  produce  for  their  own retail  outlets,  with others
engaged  in  subcontracting  --  most  often  for  Bata),  and  a host  of smaller
producers  of footwear,  including  thousands  of  cobblers  active  in  Sri  Lanka.
Along  with footwear  for  the  local  market,  two  enterprises  --  one  Japanese,  the
other  Korean  --  produced  leather  footwear  products  for  export  throughout  Sri
Lanka's  export  processing  zone.  Footwear  aside,  there  were  also  a number  of
producers  of  other  leather  products,  largely  for  exports  and  the  local  tourist
market;  these  vary in size  from  relatively  large  operations  to SMEs  with fewer
than  30 employees. Interviews  were conducted  with the  Leather  Corporation,
two  private  tanners,  Bata,  and  38 locally-owned  producers  of leather  products
and footwear  in the  greater  Colombo  area.
As the  patterns  of enterprise  participation  imply,  with the
possible  exception  of tanning,  economies  of scale  in the  leather  industries
are  limited,  and  the  scope  for  SME  participation  consequently  substantial.
Further,  export  patterns  suggest  that  Sri  Lanka's  comparative  advantage  in the
leather  industry  is  based  on an abundant  supply  of labor  skilled  in the
fabrication  of  high  value  added,  labor  intensive  leather  products. Exports  of
these  goods  --  by the  two  enterprises  located  in  the  export  zones,  by two
relatively  large  producers  of industrial  gloves  and  other  leather  products
that  are  part  of  vertically  integrated  tanning  and  leather  products
enterprises,  and  by a  half  dozen  or so SMEs --  accounted  for  over  90 percent
of Sri  Lanka's  leather  exports  in  1987. However,  with total  exports  under  $S5
million,  Sri  Lanka  has  barely  begun  to tap  its  potential  comparative  advantage
in the  export  by both  large  enterprises  and  SMEs  of  high  value  added,  labor- 7 -
intensive  leather  products. Indeed,  with the  exception  of the  two  firms
located  in the  export  zones,  not  a  single  Sri  Lankan  producer  of footwear  has
yet 4 begun  to  participate  in  any sustained  way in  the  export  of footwear. T-e
analysis  that  follows  of SME  constraints  identifies  some  of the  reasons  for
this  limited  export  performance.
Furniture  in  Tanzania. The  field  research  on Tanzania's  furniture
industry  was concentrated  on the  capital  city,  Dar  es Salaam,  and  its
surrounding  areas. Participating  firms  include  5  medium-to-large  enterprises
whose  ownerp  are  of Indian  origin  (or  --  in one  case --  an expatriate
European)  and  each  employ  up to 200  workers,  5-10  medium-sized  firms  (also
with  owners  of Indian  origin),  half  a dozen  or so long-established,
indigenously  owned  small-to-medium  ventures  (some  of  which  were taken  over
from  non-indigenous  owners  that  left  the  country  in the  late  1960s  and  early
1970s),  and  hundreds  (no  accurate  count  is  available)  of indigenous
enterprises  that  entered  the  industry  irk  the  1980s,  apparently  with some
acceleration  in  entry  since  the  initiation  of structural  adjustment  reforms  in
1985.  Some  of the  newer,  indigenouc  SMEs  have  achieved  quite  substantial
incremental  expansion,  and  at the  time  of interviews  employed  up to 70
workers. 5 Twenty-four  firms  were interviewed, .ncluding  3 in  the  medium-to-
large  category.
4 Bata  apparently  is  beginning  to explore  export  markets,  and  has set  an
export  target  of 10  percent  of total  sales  by 1992.
5  Thus,  9 of the  13 (randomly  selected)  post-1980  entrants  that  were
interviewed  started  up their  operations  in the  1986-1989  period,  and  only 4
between  1981  and  1985.  SEe  also  the  aggregate  data  in the  upcoming  Tanzania:
Country  Economic  Memorandum  that  supports  this  conclusion.The  submarkets  served  by Tanzania's  furniture  enterprises  range
from  the  completion  of large-volume  orders  for  government  agencies  and  the
export  of processed  wood products  at the  top  end  of the  market,  to roadside
males  of household  furniture  to  consumers  at the  bottom-end. Between  these
extremes  firms  produced  furniture  for  sale  in retail  shorrooms  (in  all  but  one
instance  marketing  was vertically  integrated,  with the  showrooms  owned  by the
manufacturers  themselves),  supplied  high-quality  custom  designed  furniture  for
higher-income  consumers,  and  produced  household  furniture  on tender  to
government  agencies  including  parastatals  .'e agencies,  in turn,  distribute
the  furniture  as a  fringe  benefit  to  higher-level  employees). Interviews
uncovered  evidence  of quite  substantial  mobility  among  submarkets. Smaller
enterprises  increasingly  have  moved  into  the  aid-range  of the  market:  7  of the
indigenous  SME  interviewees  won their  first  tenders  to supply  government
agencies  in the  1980s,  all  but  one  of these  in  the  pasc two  years. Although
very few  retailera  purchase  from  independent  manufacturers  for  subsequent
resale, 6 at least  one  of the  expanding  enterprises  in the  aample  responded  by
establishing  his own  makeshift  'showroom'  some  distance  from  his  workshop.
Paralleling  the  movement  of smaller  enterprises,  some  larger
enterprises  are  in the  process  of  moving  from  the  mid-range  to the  top  end  of
the  market. One enterprise  has  recently  abandoned  entirely  furniture
manufacture  to devote  itself  to the  production  fo- *xport  of  parquet  flooring
and  other  components  of  wood;  a second  enterpriee  has reduced  the  share  of
6 One  reason  for  this  absence  of intermediation  at the  retail  level  may
be the  prevailing  sales  tax  regime  which  treats  as two  separate  taxable
transactions  a sale  from  manufacturer  to retailer  and  then  from  retailer  to
final  customer,  but as  only  one  transaction  a sale  from  a  manufacturer  through
his  own showroom  to a final  consumer.- 9  -
wood furniture  in total  sales  from  50S  to 107,  shifting  instead  into  the
production  of  metal  office  furniture  for  the  domestic  market  and  the  export  of
parquet  flooring  and  other  wood components.  An important  implication  of these
moves  up-market  by larger  enterprises  is that,  rather  than  being  "crowded
out",  new  market  opportunities  are likely  continually  to emerge  for  SMEs
seeking  to expand. Subsequent  sections  of this  paper  will detail  many of the
obstacles  that  confront  indigenous  SMEs  as they  seek  to take  advantage  of the
new  opportunities.
II:  AN  ASSESSMENT  OF CONSTRAINTS
I1.1  An Overview  of the  Constraints
The  e3trtepreneurship  surveys  in the  Tanzanian  furniture  and  Sri
Lankan  leether  industries  explored  with enterprises  their  assessments  of the
relative  magnitude  of obstacles  inhibiting  their  efforts  to expand. An
initial  set  of interviews  yielded  a list  of potential  constraints  to  expansion
in  each  industry. 7 Table  1 groups  these  constraints  into  four  categories:
financing  constraints;  regulatory  constrainto;  technical,  marketing  and  other
non-financial  input  constraints;  and  cost  constraints.  As the  table  details,
there  was a  broad  overlap  between  the  two  industries  (and  countries)  in the
constraints  identified,  albeit  with some  variation  in  the specific  ways in
which  they  were formulated.
7  The small  differences  in  Table  1  between  the  constraints  for  Tanzania
and  those  for  Sri  Lanka  reflect  differences  in  the  way firms  in the  two
countries  classified  their  constraints.- 10  -
TABLE 
ASSESSMENTS  BY  A  SAMPLE  OF 38  SRI LANKAN  LEATHER  PRODUCTS  SMES  AND
19  TANZANIAN  SMIS OF THE RCLATIVI MAGNITUDE  OF OBSTACLES  TO EXPANSION
NORMALIZED  SCORRIS  BY SIZE OF FIRM
TANZANIAN  SRI  LANKAN
Obstacles  SHEs  SMEs
(a)  Financial  Market
Constraints:
Lack  of  Access  to  Finance  0.97  0.58
(b)  Regulatory  Constraints:
Potential  Changes  in  Tax  Status  - 0.25
Bureaucratic  Procedures  0.67  0.09
Labor  Regulations  _  0.07
Policy  Uncertainty  - 0.10
Lack  of  Access  to Industrial  Sites  0.64  -
(c)  Constraints  on  Access
to  Non-Financial  Inputs:
(i) Physical  Inputs
Lack  of  Access  o  Materials  - 0.41
Lack  of Access  to  Spare  Parts  0.38  -
Lack  of Access  to  Wood  0.16
Lack  of  Access  to  Equipment  0.26  -
(ii) Technical  and
Marketing  Inputs
Scarcity  of  Competent  Workers  0.14  0.21
Lack  of Technical  Skills  0.11  0.19
Not  Enough  Domestic  Buyers  0.28  0.11
(d)  Cost  Constraints:
Cost of Finance  0.72  0.73
Cost  of Materials  0.63  0.61
Cost  of  Equipment  0.58  0.49
NUMBER  OF FIRMS  19  38- 11  -
For each  industry,  entrepreneurs  were  presented  with the  relevant
list  and  asked  to rank  each  constraint  on a scale  of 1 to 5  according  to its
degree  of severity. Table  1 summarizes  the  results  obtained  after  normalizing
the  scores  provided  by individual  entrepreneurs  along  a scale  of zero (least
severe)  to one (most  severe), 8 and  averaging  across  entrepreneurs  the
resulting  normalized  scores  for  each  constraint;  the  resultant  statistics
provide  cardinal  measures  of the  relative  severity  of each  constraint  in  each
country. The  next  subsections  review  and  interpret  in  depth  the  results
obtained  for  financing  constraints,  regulatory  constraints,  and  physical
input,  technical  and  marketing  constraints.  But  before  proceeding  with the
detailed  interpretations,  two  features  of the  results  and subsequent
interpretation  are  worth  noting.
First,  although  all  of the  various  cost  constraints  scored
relatively  high for  both  industries,  they  will  not receive  any  further
attention  insofar  as their  high scores  do  not  necessarily  signal  any  kind of
government  or market  imperfection.  On the  contrary,  reports  by enterprises  of
high input  prices  can  be interpreted  as a signal  of significant  competitive
pressure  and  an  associated  squeeze  on profits,  both  of  which  are  desirable
8  Normalization  is  necessary  since  there  is  no basis  for  comparing  the
assessments  of  entrepreneurs  as to the  absolute  magnitudes  of severity  of the
various  obstecles.  For  example,  one  entrepreneur  might  choose  to rank  the
entire  set  of obstacles  within  the  1  to 3 range,  while  another  --  with
identical  perceptions  of the  relative  severity  of the  obstacles  --  might  scale
his  ranking  in the  3 to 5 range.  While  the  similarities  between  the  two
entrepreneurs  in the  relative  ranking  of obstacles  represents  important
information  for  policy,  nothing  of general  usefulness  for  policy  can  be
learned  from  evidence  of differences  among  entrepreneurs  in  their  subjective
perceptions  of the  absolute  magnitude  of challenge  posed  by the  obstacles.
Calibration  of each  firm's  assessment  of the  severity  of the  obstacles  on a
scale  of 0 to 1  controls  for  Jifferences  among  entrepreneurs  in their
subjective  perceptions  of the  absolute  level  of  difficulty  posed  by the
obstacles  they  confront.- 12 -
insofar  as they  induce  enterprises  to  innovate  and  become  more efficient. 9
Second,  cost  constraints  aside,  there  is significantly  greater
variation  in  the  constraint  scores  for  Tanzania  than  for  Sri  Lanka,  with the
three  most  binding  Tanzanian  constraints  (lack  of access  to finance,
bureaucratic  procedures,  and  lack  of access  to industrial  sites)  all  scoring
higher  than  the  most  binding  of the  Sri  Lankan  constraints  (lack  of access  to
finance). These  results  reflect  significantly  more consensus  among  Tanzanian
than  Sri  Lankan  SMEs  as to  what are  their  most  binding  non-price  constraints.
For  example,  the  lack  of access  to finance  was identified  as the  most severe
constraint  on expansion  by eighteen  of  nineteen  respondent  furniture  firms  in
Tanzania,  accounting  for  the  score  of 0.97 (out  of  a feasible  maximum  of 1)
accorded  that  constraint  in  Table  1.  As will  become  apparent  below,  this
variation  among  the  countries  in  the  extent  of consensus  reflects  in turn  the
contrast  between  the  Tanzanian  environment  characterized  by a few,  rigidly
binding  non-price  constraints  that  inhibit  SHE  exparLiion,  and  the
significantly  less  restrictive  environment  for  SMEs  in Sri  Lanka.
II.2 Constraints  on  Access  to  Finance
As the  constraint  scores  in Table  1 reveal,  lack  of access  to
finance  emerged  as the leading  non-price  constraint  on SMEs  in both  Tanzania
and  Sri  Lanka,  albeit  with  a significantly  higher  absolute  score  in  the former
9  Note  also  the  possibility  that  obstacles  associated  with high input
costs  might  signal  leads  and  lags  in the  transmission  of  macroeconomic  policy
changes  to firms,  with the  price  of some  inputs  rising  rapidly  in response  to
changes  in  macro  variables  (the  nominal  exchange  rate,  or the rate  of
inflation  to cite  two  examples)  while  output  prices  adjust  more slowly.- 13 -
country. Yet  evidence  of financing  constraints  need  not imply  that  there
exist  imperfections  in financial  markets  that  warrant  attention  by
policymakers,  since  there  inevitably  will  be financially  constrained
enterprises  to  whom it  would  be imprudent  for  any  financial  intermediary  to
lend. Thus,  additional  empirical  analysis  is required  to evaluate  whether  the
constraint  scores  signify  a serious  market  failure  in securing  access  to
finance  on the  part  of SHEs.
It is  helpful  to  preface  the  analysis  by summarizing  briefly  what
is  known  internationally  as to  the  financing  of small  and  medium  enterprises.
The  evidence  is  persuasive 10 that  the  incentives  are  weak for  formal  financial
institutions  to lend  to SMEs:  loan  sizes  are  small,  so  the  costs  of processing
tend  to  be  high relative  to loan  amounts;  the  track  record  and  reputation  of a
putative  SME  borrower  is likely  to  be limited  (as  is  the  system  of financial
accounting),  adding  further  to the  costs  of loan  processing;  and  the
probability  of failure  is  high even  for  well-conceived  new  ventures.
Unsurprisingly  in the  light  of these  incentive  patterns,  SMEs  worldwide  tend
to finance  the  start-up  of their  operations  with savings  from  the  enterprise
proprietor,  support  from  family  members,  short-term  credit  provided  by
suppliers,  advances  offered  by  buyers,  or loans  from  informal,  community-
based  financial  intermediaries  who  are  able  to  draw  on local  knowledge  as to
the  reliability  of a putative  borrower,  and  on the  community  sanction  of
reputation  to  ensure  loan  repayment. In general,  only  once  an SME  has
demonstrated  some  record  of success  is it able  to tap  into  the  resources  of
10 I.H.D  Little,  Dipak  Mazumdar  and  John  M. Page  Jr Small  Manufacturing
Enterprises  (Oxford  University  Press  for  the  World  Bank,  1987)  pp.  279-287
provide  a  useful  summary  of available  evidence  on SME  financing.- 14  -
the  formal  financial  system.
As Table  2 summarizes,  the  financing  mechanisms  of both  Sri  Lankan
and  Tanzanian  SMEs  exhibit  some  similarities  to the  stylized  general  pattern,
albeit  with some  suggestive  differences  between  the two  countries. One
feature  common  to  both  countries  is the  dominant  role  of own savings:
consistent  with the  general  pattern,  all  but  one  of the  58 OMER  for  which  data
were  available  drew  on the  savings  of the  proprietor.
By contrast  to the  similar  role  of own  savings,  there  are
significant  differences  between  the  two  countries  in the  role  of informal
credit  (including  trede  credit). Paralleling  the  general  pattern,  trade
credits  or informal  financial  intermediaries  each  have been  used  by about  30
percent  of the  sampled  Sri  Lankan  enterprises,  with half  the  sample  having
used  at least  one  of these  informal  sources. 11  Interestingly,  32 percent  of
the  Sri  Lankan  sample  reported  using  at least  one  of these  sources  of informal
credit  in  their  initial  years  of  operation,  prior  to securing  finance  from  the
formal  banking  sector.
In  Tanzania,  none  of the  sample  enterprises  obtained  financing  via
either  trade  credits  or informal  intermediaries, 1 2 although  the  widespread  use
of partnerships  in that  country  could  be interpreted  as representing  a
substitute  channel  of informal  financing. The  absence  of trade  credit  can in
11 3 of the  sampled  Srl  Lankan  SMEs  obtained  finance  via  both  trade
credits  and  informal  financial  institutions.
12 The  picture  is  quite  different  for  non-indigenous  entrepreneurs  active
in  Tanzania  who apparently  have  access  to  well-developed  informal  mechanisms
of financial  intermediation.- 15  -
TABLE 2
SOURCES OF FINANCE  FOR  58  SRI  LANKAN AND TANZANIAN SMEs
(Z  OF  SAMPLE FIRMS  THAT OBTAINED FINANCE  FROM EACH SOURCE)
TANZANIAN  SRI  LANKAN
FURNITURE SMEs  LEATHER SMEs
Own Savings/  95.0  100.02
Retained Earnings
Family  25.0  34.2
Partner.  45.0  2.6
Formal Financial  45.0  42.1
Institutions
Informal Financial  0.0  28.9
Institutions
Trade  Credit  0.0  28.9
Number  of  Firms  20  38- 16 -
part  be accounted  for  by the  virtual  breakdown  of Tanzania's  chequing  system
in the  fsce  of both  pervasive  banking  inefficiencies  (on  which  more  below)  and
a legal  system  which  affords  only  protracted  and  uncertain  recourse;  legally-
binding  post-dated  cheques  are  commonly  used  as credit  and  payment  mechanisms
in  countries  where  firms  make  extensive  use  of trade  credit. As for  the
absence  of other  informal  lending  mechanisms  for  indigenous  enterprises,  here
the  Tanzanian  pattern  appears  illustrative  of  a lacuna  that  is evident
throughout  East  Africa.
Turning  to formal  finance,  in  Tanzania  a number  of financial
institutions  (all  state-owned,  as  are  all  financial  institutions  in the
country)  have  the responsibility  in  principle  for  providing  financial  support
to SMEs:  a small  enterprise  lending  unit  has  been  operating  in  the  National
Bank  of  Commerce  since  1982;  since  1974  the  Small  Industries  Development
Organization  (SIDO)  has  provided  financing  for  the  purchase  of new  equipment;
in  principle  the  Co-operative  and  Rural  Development  Bank  also  lends  to  SMEs.
By contrast  to Tanzania,  Sri  Lanka's  banking  system  is  highly  diversified,  and
includes  4  domestic  commercial  banks  (2  government  owned),  four  regional  rural
development  banks,  two  industrial  development  banks,  21 foreign  commercial
banks,  and  a  host of finance  companies,  leasing  companies  and  insurance
companies. At the  very least,  all  4 domestic  commercial  banks,  both
industrial  development  banks,  and  the  regional  rural  development  banks
actively  are  engaged  in lending  to SMEs. A comprehensive  analysis  of the
performance  of Tanzania's  and  Sri  Lanka's  financial  institutions  is  beyond  the
scope  of the  present  paper. Rather  the  task  here  is the  narrower  one  of
evaluating  that  performance  from  the  perspective  of the  putative  borrowers  --
the  SM¢s  themselves.- 17 -
Table  3 disaggregates  the  Sri  Lankan  and  Tanzanian  SMEs  with
access  to formal  bank  loans  by size  and  age  of the  enterprises.  As the  table
reveals,  only 1  of 18 Sri  Lankan,  and  1 of 7 Tanzanian  SMEs  with 5 or fewer
employees  and less  than  3  years  of experience  had access  to formal  finance;
these  patterns  of lending  are  consistent  with the  theory  and  empirical
evidence  suarized  earlier  that  it is  entirely  rational  for  banks  not to lend
to the  smallest  and least  established  firms. Coverage  within  the  pool  of
'qualifying'  clients  (those  with  more  than  5 employees,  and  at least  3  years
of experience)  appears  similar  in the  two  ccuntries,  with loans  extended  to 75
percent  (15  of 20)  of the  qualifying  Sri  Lankan  SMEs,  and  about  70  percent  (9
of 13)  of the  qualifying  Tanzanian  firms.
What the  data in  Table  3  do not reveal  are  the  sharp  differences
between  the  two  countries  in  the  characteristics  of those qualifying'
borrowers  without  loans,  and  in the  service  afforded  to SMEs  with loans. Four
of the  five  qualifying  Sri  Lankan  SMEs  without  loans  reported  that  they  were
not  financially  constrainedl 3, and  exhibited  no interest  in  borrowing  from
banks. By contrast,  all  5 of the  qualifying  Tanzanian  firms  that  were  without
loans  identified  lack  of access  to finance  as among  their  leading
constraints. 14 Three  of the  five  were among  the  most successful  and rapidly
expanding  SMEs  in the  sample;  all  three  made initial  approaches  to the  banks
Table  3
13  Each  of these  4 SMEs  recorded  0 (zero)  as their  normalized  score  for
access  to finance  as a constraint  on expansion.
14 The  constraint  score  for  lack  of access  to finance  was the  maximum
possible  of 1 for  4  of the  5 firms,  and  0.75  for  the  fifth._  18  -
TABLE  3
ACCESS  TO FORMAL ANU  CREDIT FOR 57  SRI  LANKAN  AND TANXAkIAN  SMES
BY SIZE  AND  AGE OF FIRt
Age  of Firm
6  or
Size  of Firm  0 - 2 Years  3 - 5 Years  more Years  Total
As  Sri  Lanka
1 - 5 Employees  1/8  0/2  0/5  1/15
6  - 15 Employees  0/3  1/2  4/6  5/11
16 or More  Employees  - 1/1  9/11  10/12
TOTAL  1/11  2/5  13/22  16/38
8:  Tanzania
1  - 5 Employees  0/3  0/3  - 0/6
6 - 15  Employees  1/1  1/2  214  4/7
16 or More Employees  - 0/1  5/6  5/7
TOTAL  1/4  1/6  7/10  9/20
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for  loans,  but  without  success  am of the  time  of the  interviews. 15 In large
part,  their  difficulties  can  be attributed  to the  exceedingly  burdensome
conditions  that  Tanzanian  SMEs must  meet if  they  are  to qualify  for  loans.
According  to interviewees,  loan  applicants  are  required  to  provide  fixed
property  as  collateral;  since  the  banks  refuse  to recognize  leasehold  land
title  (the  only  form  of land  title  permitted  in Tanzania)  as collateral,  only
individuals  with the  resources  to erect  physical  structures  on their  land  can
borrow,  and  only  to the  value  of these  physical  structures.  Further,  along
with collateral,  applicants  are  required  to provide  detailed  feasibility
studies  of their  projected  investments  (even  where  commercial  bank loans  take
the  form  of overdraft  facilities,  typically  used  for  working  capital),  as  well
as  detailed  financial  statements.  Even  with collateral,  feasibility  studies,
and financial  statements  in  hand,  firms  reported  that  the  processing  of loan
applications  takes  an  average  of six  months,  and  may still  require  side
payments  as a precondition  for  processing.
As for  service  to SMEs  with loans,  while  Sri  Lanka's  16  borrower
SMEs  appeared  satisfied  with the  service  they  were afforded,  8  of the  9 SMEs
with loans  in Tanzania  complained  bitterly  about  their  relationship  with the
banks. The  difficulties  of 3 of the  firms  appear  to  be related  to the
precarious  financial  condition  of the  enterprises  themselves.  but  of the
remaining  6 (healthy)  firms,  2 reported  that  the  bank imposed  its  own
arbitrary  loan  ceiling  thereby  disrupting  the  enterprise's  business  plan  even
though  all  prerequisites  for  a larger  loan  had  been fulfilled,  and  2 others
15  One firm  still  had  no response  two  years  after  the  initial
application;  a second  was  waited  already  for  six  months,  and  expects  an
additional  one  year's  wait.  The  third  approached  a bank  in 1988,  but  was
discouraged  by burdensome  bureaucracy  and  a  demand  for  SME  payments.- 20 -
reported  that  their  banker  temporarily  shut  down  their  overdraft  facilities,
over  disputes  that  were  peripheral  to the  lending  relationship  itself. The
conclusion  that  emerges  from  the  interviews  is that  Tanzania's  banks  do not
view their  lending  to indigenous  SMEs  in  developmental  terms,  with a goal  of
identifying  and supporting  enterprises  that  have real  potential  to succeed
commercially,  and  a  mutual  interest  on the  part of  both the  bank  and the
enterprise  in  a venture's  success. Rather,  as indigenous  enterprises  see  it,
the  banks  perceive  them  to  be unwelcome  supplicants,  to  be dealt  with only so
long  as stringent  conditions  are  met  and,  even  then,  only  so long  as the
enterprise  respects  without  question  the  omniscient  authority  of the  lending
agency.
In all,  the  constraint  scores  and  detailed  empirical  analysis
reveal  a good  deal  about  the  relative  im,ortance  of lack  of access  to finance
as an obstacle  to SHE  expansion  in the  two  sample  countries. In  Tanzania,  the
evidence  that  finance  represents  the  binding  constra'nt  appears  unambiguous:
not  only  were Tanzania's  SMEs  virtually  unanimous  in scoring  lack  of access  to
finance  as their  leading  obstacle  to  expansion,  the  disaggregated  analysis
points  to a  virtual  disintegration  of Tanzania's  financial  system  for  SMEs.
By contrast  to Tanzania,  only  14 of the  38 SMEs  sampled  in Sri  Lanka
identified  lack  of access  to finance  as their  leading  constraint  on expansion.
Further,  consistent  with  evidence  that  Sri  Lanka's  banks  rationally  choose  not
to lend  to the  smallest  and  least  established  firms,  8  of the  14 financially
constrained  SMEs  either  had  been  in  business  for  less  than  3  years  or had  5 or
fewer  employees;  and  3  of the  6 remaining  financially  constrained  SMEs
reported  current  levels  of employment  to be  well  below  some  earlier  peak- 21 -
level, 16 suggesting  that  they  might  be serious  credit  risks. Absent  these  11
SMEs,  Sri  Lanka's  score  for  lack  of access  to finance  as an  obstacle  to
expansion  falls  to  0.41.  Together  the  constraint  scores  and  disaggregated
analysis  suggest  that,  while  some  of the  smallest  and  least  established  Sri
Lankan  SMEs  indeed  appear  to  be credit  constrained,  for  the  more established
SMEs  the system  of financing  functions  well  and is  not  a serious  obstacle  to
continued  expansion.
I1.3  Regulatory  Constraints
Consistent  with the  general  approach  outlined  in the  introduction,
the  analysis  of regulatory  constraints  in Sri  Lanka  and  Tanzania  focused  not
on the formal  regulations  themselves  but  rather  on the impact  of these
regulations  on SMEs.  The  analysis  shows  regulatory  constraints  to be
significantly  more binding  to  Tanzanian  SMEs  than  to their  Sri  Lankan
counterparts.  Further,  it shows  that  there  are  substantial  differences
between  the  impact  that  might  be deduced  from  perusal  of the  formal
regulations  themselves,  and  the  impact  as actually  experienced  by SMEs.
Finally,  it shows  that  regulation  can  inhibit  SHE  expansion  in two  quite
different  ways,  wiith  one  of these  operative  in Tanzania,  and  the  other (if  to
a lesser  extent)  in Sri  Lanka.
The  scores  for  the  two  sets  of regulatory  constraints  included  in
Table  1 for  Tanzania  --  lack  of access  to industrial  sites  and  bureaucratic
procedures  --  both  are  relatively  high,  at 0.64  and  0.67  respectively.  The
16  In all,  7  of the  38 sample  Sri  Lankan  enterprises  reported  their
employment  levels  as of 1990  as  below  some  earlier,  peak level.- 22 -
catch-all  category  of bureaucratic  procedures  subsumes  the  relations  of
Tanzanian  SMEs  with a  wide range  of regulatory  authorities,  including  sales
and  income  tax  authorities,  town  councils  which  serve  as  licensing
authorities,  providers  of public  utilities  (power,  telephone  and  water),  the
National  Provident  Fund,  and  officials  from  the  Labor  Ministry;  in  practice,
as detailed  further  below,  Tanzanian  SMEs  reported  that  their  bureaucratic
difficulties  were  most substantial  with  the  sales,  income  tax  and licensing
authorities. Table  1  provides  more  disaggregation  for  the  Sri  Lankan
regulatory  constraints,  explicitly  separating  labor  regulations  and  the
constraint  associated  with potential  changes  in tax  status  from  other
bureaucratic  procedures  that  might  inhibit  SME  expansion;  the  latter  includes
local  licensing  requirements,  and  relations  with the  providers  of public
utilities. 17 By contrast  to the  results  for  Tanzania,  the  scores  are
relatively  low  for  all  three  Sri  Lankan  regulatory  constraints.
Table  4  decomposes  the  constraint  scores  by size  and (for  Sri
Lanka)  legal  status  of SMEs. The  decomposition  uncovers  svstematic  variation
in  the  impact  of regulatory  constraints  among  SMEs,  with the  pattern  of
variation  different  across  the  two  countries. Whereas  in  Tanzania  the  scores
are  largest  for  the smallest  enterprises,  in Sri  Lanka  the scores  rise  as
enterprise  size  increases  for  all  three  sets  of constraints,  with the  rise
somewhat  larger  for  the  tax  constraint  than  for  the  others;  additionally,
independent  of size,  tax  constraints  appear  to  be especially  significant  for
17  Access  to adequate  industrial  premises  is  not included  in the  category
of  bureaucratic  procedures.  Wile  scattered  anecdotal  information  suggests
that  this  might  indeed  represent  a constraint  for  some  SMEs.,  the  Sri  Lankan
survey  was  not implemented  in  a  way that  could  systematically  shed  light  on
the  issue.- 23  -
TABLE  4
SCORES  FOR  REGULATORY  CONSTRAINTS  AS OBSTACLES  TO SME  EXPANSION
IN  SRI  LAMK AND  TANZANIA,  BY SIZE OF FIRM
Size of Firm
1  -5  6  - 15  16  of more
Employees  Employees  Employees  Total
Bureaucratic
rrocedures
Sri  Lanka  0.02  0.00  0.25  0.09
Tanzania  0.83  0.60  0.62  0.67
Access  to
Industrial  Site
Tanzania  only  0.77  0.62  0.34  0.64
Potential  Changes  in
Tax  Status  (Sri  Lanka  only)
Legal  Status
(a)  Unregistered  0.03 (11)3/  0.00 (1)aI  - 0.03
(b)  Partnership/Sole
Proprietorship  0.01  (4)1/  0.27 (8)a/  0.28 (9)a/  0.22
(c)  Limited Liability
Company  - 100  ()aI  0.83 (3 )aI  0.88
(d)  All  0.02  0.32  0.42  0.25
Labor  Regulations
(Sri  Lanka  only)  0.00  0.05  0.17  0.07
(a)  Limited  Liability
Company  0.00  0.00 (1)a/  0.42  0.31
(b)  All  Others  0.00  0.05  0.08  0.04
a/  Number  of Firms  in  Brackets- 24 -
the  limited  liability  companies  in  the  Sri  Lankan  sample. 1 8. What accounts
for  these  divergent  patterns?
To  begin  with  Sri  Lanka,  the  increase  with firm  size  in  the
constraint  score  for  bureaucratic  procedures  can  straightforwardly  be
attributed  to administrative  obstacles  associated  with exporting  --  the
average  constraint  score  was  0.6 for  the  5  exporting  firms  (all  in  the largest
category)  but  0.0  for  the  remaining  7 larger  enterprises.  As for  tax  and
labor  regulation,  the  explanation  for  these  scores  is  that  compliance  with
prevailing  regulatory  and  tax  obligations  by that  countvy's  SMEs  presently  is
exceedingly  uneven. The formal  tax  obligations  of  manufacturers  of footwear
and leather  products  are relatively  high:  a turnover  tax  amounting  to 152  of
gross  revenuesl 9, and  a tax  of 33-502  on net  income. In  practice,
interviewees  of all  sizes  and  legal  statuses  conceded  that  their  tax  payments
are  substantially  below  the  formally  mandated  levels. Unregistered  firms
reported  that  they  paid  no taxes. Partnerships  and iole  proprietorships  are
officially  registered  and  thus  cannot  maintair  the  formal  invisibility  of
their  unregistered  counterparts.  However,  they  are  not required  to maintain
accounts,  and  consequently  enjoy  significant  discretion  as to their  declared
levels  of revenue  and  profits;  consistent  with  the  data  in  Table  4, a number
of firms  in this  group  volunteered  in interviews  that  enterprise  visibility
(and  thus  size)  was  an important  determinant  of  whether  (and  how  thoroughly)
18 Interestingly,  although  their  absolute  values  were lower  than  for  the
tax  variable,  the  average  scores  for  labor  regulations  and  for  policy
uncertainty  --  0.42  and  0.44  respectively  --  were significantly  higher  for  the
4 limited  liability  enterprises  than  for  the  remainder  of the  sample.
19  Officials  at the  Ministry  of Finance  reported  that  the  152  rate  had
recently  been increased  to 20Z;  even  so,  interviewees  continued  to report  that
they  were subject  to a 15?  rate.- 25 -
they  might  be investigated  by the  tax  authorities.  Limited  liability
companies  have less  room  for  manoeuvre,  insofar  as  they  are  required  to
maintain  audited  accounts. 20 Further,  as  Table  4 implies,  the  increased
visibility  of limited  liability  companies  also  appears  to  make them  more
likely  targets  of enforcement  of labor  regulations. 21
In sum,  what the  data  for  Sri  Lanka  in Table  4 imply  is  that the
opportunities  for  tax  evasion  diminish 22 with increases  in size  and  with more
formal  legal  status. Enterprises  that  grow (or  shift  to limited  liability
status)  run  the  risk  of suddenly  finding  themselves  liable  for  very large
increases  in  tax  obligations.  As a result,  many  entrepreneurs  rationally
limit  their  efforts  at expansion. 23 More generally,  the  variations  in
constraint  score  by size  and  legal  status  suggest  that  the  combination  of  high
formal  tax  and  regulatory  obligations  and  their  uneven  enforcement  create  a
discontinuity  in the  structure  of costs  of Sri  Lankan  enterprises  as they
grow,  thereby  inhibiting  expansion  beyond  some  moderate  level,  and  limiting
20 But  even  foz  these  companies,  the sense  was  conveyed  in interviews
that  a combination  of a low  profile  and  creative  accounting  could  help to
limit  their  tax  burden.
21 Interestingly,  although  not  too  much  should  be read  into  them,  the
data  suggest  that  participation  in  export  markets  increases  visibility  and
consequent  vulnerability  to labor  regulation:  within  the  largest  size
category,  the  average  score  of the  labor  regulation  constraint  was 0.2  for  the
4 non-limited-liability  exporters,  but  0.0  for  the  remaining  5  non-limited-
liability  firms.
22 Put  differently,  the  implication  is  that  the  risks  and  associated
costs  of tax  evasion  increase  with size  and  more formal  legal  status,  with
concomitant  increases  in  the  extent  of tax  compliance.
23 One  important  exception  is  expansion  into  export  markets,  where
earnings  presently  are  tax  free.  However,  export  growth  is  also likely  to be
indirectly  limited,  insofar  as tax  obligations  inhibit  tirms  from  growing
incrementally  in the  domestic  market  and  progressively  improving  their
capabilities  to the  point  that  they  perceive  themselves  to  be ready  to export.- 26 -
the  potential  of Sri  Lanka's  SHE.  to serve  as  a seedbed  for  the  emergence  of
dynamic  national  firms.
The  constraints  created  by regulatory  practice  are  quite  different
in Tanzania. As in  Sri  Lanka,  Tanzania's  formal  tax  and regulatory
requirements  are  demanding. However,  unlike  Sri  Lanka,  enforcement  is
comprehensive,  albeit  with  pervasive  lubrication  and  renegotiation  of formal
obligations.  The  net  effect  of the  Tanzanian  pattern  is  to impose  entry  and
expansion-deterring  costs  on all  enterprises,  both financial  costs  and  the
opportunity  cost  associated  with the  diversion  of scarce  entrepreneurial  time
and  effort  away from  socially  efficient  wealth-generating  activities; 24
consistent  with the scores  in Table  4,  the  relative  burden  of these  costs
appears  to fall  with increases  in firm  size. The  examples  of enterprise
licensing,  and sales  and  income  tax  assessment  and  collection  illustrate.
Irrespective  of size,  all  Tanzanian  furniture  enterprises  formally
are  obligated  to license  their  ventures  with local  authorlties,  and  formally
are  liable  for  very  substantial  payments  of taxes. Enterprises  with fewer
than  ten  employees  are  required  to  obtain  a trading  license;  enterprises  with
more than  ten  employees  and  enterprises  that  sell  to government  agencies  are
required  to obtain  a  business  license. Sales  tax  for  sales  of furniture,
24 Interestingly,  since  for  any  individual  enterprise  that  is  too small
to  hire  a  manager  the  supply  of entrepreneurial  talent  is  perfectly  inelastic,
even if  the  costs  imposed  take  the  form  solely  of fixed  costs  that  are
invariant  with enterprise  size,  they  can  nonetheless  inhibit  the  expansion  of
enterprises  that  have  already  entered  into  production.  Analytically,  the
argument  is that  entrepreneurship  is  complementary  to  other  inputs  into
production.  Thus,  by freeing  up the  entrepreneur's  time  to  manage  his
enterprise,  a reduction  of bureaucratic  costs  would  lead  to a downward  shift
of both  fixed  and  variable  cost  schedules.- 27 -
payable  by  manufacturers  (and  again  by retailers  if  they  operate  independently
of the  producers),  is  formally  set  at a rate  equal  to 252  of sales  revenue;
income  taxes  are  set  at 50S  of  enterprise  profits. In practice,  enforcement
of  Tanzania's  tax  and  licensing  requirements  (at  least  in  the  capital  c.ty)
was  very thorough. All of the  interviewees  canvassed  on the  subject  confirmed
that  they  were licensed  to  operate  by the  Dar  Es Salaam  City  Council.
Similarly,  with  even  the  smallest  furniture  enterprises  in the  sample
confirming  that  they  were regularly  held liable  for  tax  payment,  there  appears
to be  no lower  bound  on the  size  of firms  that  fall  within  the  tax  net.
The  combination  of cumbersome  and  punitive  formal  tax  and
licensing  requirements  and  ubiquitous  enforcement  create  substantial
opportunities  for  officials  to extract  side  payments  from  even  the  smallest
Tanzanian  SMEs. Licenses  must be renewed  annually. While  the  fee  is  modest,
and  is calculated  on a sliding  scale  according  to the  size  of the  enterprise,
each  renewal  is  dependent  on prior  clearance  from  (among  others)  the  various
sales  and income  tax  authorities. In the  best  of circumstances,  obtaining  all
these  clearances  and  thereafter  the  license  renewal  imposes  a significant
burden  on the  scarce  time  of the  enterprise  proprietor. In circumstances
where  not  all  the  necessary  clearances  have  been  obtained,  the  proprietor  is
at the  mercy  of the  licensing  official. In  practice,  incomplete  compliance
does  not appear  to  have  served  as a  pretext  for  obstructing  entry,  or led  to
the  shutting  down  of enterprises,  but instead  functions  as a vehicle  for
officials  to extract  side  payments. Hence  the  report  of 7  of 13 interviewees
that 'lubrication'  is  an integral  part  of the  completion  each  year  of license
formalities.- 28 -
Side  payments  also  are  ubiquitous  in the  implementation  of tax,l.
laws:  only  1  of 13 interviewees  was  willing  to  characterize  the system  of tax
collection  (of  both sales  and  income  taxes)  as 'legitimate';  the  remaining  12
firms  confirmed  instead  that 'lubrication'  was pervasive  in  their  dealings
with the  tax  authorities.  Nor is  harassment  by tax  officials  only  occasional.
With sales  tax  legally  payable  on a  monthly  basis,  tax  officials  have the
opportunity  to visit  individual  enterprises  and 'negotiate'  their  tax  burden
twelve  times  annually. In  practice,  the  number  of  negotiations  is  somewhat
fewer  --  the  number  of visits  over  the  past  twelve  months  by sales  tax
officials  to the  thirteen  firms  that  provided  information  ranged  from  a low  of
2 to  a high  of 10,  with the  ave;age  5  per  annum  --  but  the  burden  on
enterprises  is  hardly  trivial;  all  4 of  the furniture  firms  that  provided  a
ranking  highlighted  the  burden  of dealing  with sales  tax  officials  as the  most
severe  of the  regulatory  obstacles  which  they  confronted. Income  tax is
payable  annually,  so in  principle  the  number  of legally  mandated  visits  is
fewer. However,  individual  tax  assessors  have the  right  to re-examine  the
accounts  of any  enterprise  at  any  time  on the  grounds  that  inaccurate
information  has been  filed;  hence  a ,sported  average  of 2  visits  per  annum
from  income  tax  officials.
Underlying  the  improper  implementation  of tax  laws  appears  to  be a
broad  perception  that  tax  requirements  impose  an unmanageable  burden  on
enterprises.  This  perception  (together  with the  low  salaries  paid  government
employees)  legitimizes 25 for  both  owners  and  tax  collectors  a process  whereby
25 To  be sure,  sometimes  the  process  of renegotiation  can  be quite
antagonistict  one  four-person  enterprise  described  how an initial  reluctance
to 'lubricate'  resulted  in  a sales  tax  assessment  so  high  that it  stood  to
bankrupt  the  venture;  at  that  point,  the  owner  had  no alternative  but  to plead- 29 -
the  tax  obligations  on enterprises  are  renegotiated  (via  downward  estimates  of
sales  revenue  and  profits),  with associated  side  payments  to the  tax  assessors
themselves.  More  generally,  pervasive  lubrication  reduces  the  impact  on firms
of egregiously  unrealistic  regulatory  policies. 26 Obviously,  the  pattern  of
unrealistic  policy  offset  by pervasive  lubrication  is  hardly  desirable:
corruption  is  wrong;  it  gives  arbitrary  advantages  to firms  that  are  more
successful  in  cultivating  co-operative  relations  with  public  officials;  it
compels  even  entrepreneurs  who  might  otherwise  prefer  to adhere  to  what is
legally  required  to 'lubricate'  the  system  if  they  are  to survive  in  a highly
competitive  environment;  and  it  undermines  broadly  the  capability  of the
public  administration  to  perform  thuie  functions  where  their  contribution  is
necessary. Even  so,  from  the  perspective  of private  firms,  lubrication
tempers  what  would  otherwise  be a  near-impossible  environment  for  conducting
business.
As noted,  however,  the  combination  of unrealistic  policy  and
pervasive  lubrication  does  not  have a similar  proportional  impact  on all
firms. The  official  payments,  side  payments,  and  time  spent  navigating  the
bureaucratic  morass  represent  entry-  and  expansion-deterring  costs  on
onterprises,  comprising  both financial  elements  and  the  opportunity  cost  of
with the  assessor  to  accept  lubrication  in  return  for  scaling  down  the  tax
bill.
26 This  judgement  does  not  apply  to  the  constraint  associated  with lack
of access  to an industrial  site.  A recalculation  of the  constraint  score  in
Table  3 to exclude  with access  to  an  industrial  site  and  SMEs  that  had no
interest  in expansion  yields  a result  of 0.86,  implying  that for  many
entrepreneurs  the  scarcity  of land  in  Dar  Es  Salaam  allocated  to industrial
use  represents  almost  as  substantial  an  obstacle  to  expansion  as does  lack  of
access  to finance.  Further,  four  of ten  SMEs  without  sites  volunteered
directly  that  they  would  expand  if they  had access  to such  a site,  implying
that insecure  land  rights  inhibit  investment.- 30 -
the fixed  resource  of the  entrepreneur's  time. When firms  are  large  enough
they  can 'grow  out'  of the  costs  imposed  by an obstructionist  bureaucracy:
senior  executives  can  delegate  the  management  of relations  with  the
bureaucracy  to employees;  they  can  use  the  influence  afforded  by their
economic  power  to shield  themselves  against  egregious  examples  of  harassment;
and,  where  necessary,  they  can  cover  whatever  s.  -e  payments  are  required
without  reducing  substantially  the  working  capital  available  for  their
business  enterprises. Smaller  enterprises  do not  have  these  options  and
hence,  as the  data  for  Tanzania  in  Table  5 imply,  confront  a  significantly
greater  regulatory  burden  relative  to their  larger  counterparts.  In all,
Tanzania's  regulatory  environment  has  the  paradoxical  (and  presumably
unintended)  consequence  of strengthening  the  competitive  position  of large,
often  non-indigenous  enterprises  in relation  to indigenous  SMEs.
II.4  Constraints  on  Access  to  Non-financial  Inputs
The  non-financial  inputs  considered  in this  section  include
physical  inputs  into  production,  labor,  and  technical  and  marketing  skills  and
information.  Unlike  constraints  associated  with regulation  or access  to
finance,  constraints  in  access  to  non-financial  inputs  tend  to be sector-
specific. So,  where  relevant  information  is available,  this  section  will draw
on survey  results  from  other  sectors  in addition  to furniture  and  to leather
products.
Physical  inputs  into  production. Difficulties  in gaining  access
to  physical  inputs  turned  out  to  be more  constraining  in  both relative  and
absolute  terms  in the  Sri  Lankan  leather  industry  than  they  were for  Tanzanian- 31 -
furniture  producers. Not  only  is the  aggregate  constraint  score  for  access  to
physical  inputs  higher  for  Sri  Lanka  than  Tanzania,  disaggregation  reveals  a
sharp  divergence  in Sri  Lanka (but  not Tanzania)  in  the  severity  of the
constraint  by size  of fim: the  average  score  for  the  15 sample  Sri  Lankan
firms  with 5  or fewer  employees  was a low  0.16 (a  reflection  of their
willingness  to  make do  with odd  lots  of low  quality  leather);  the  average  for
the  23 remaining  (larger)  enterprises  was 0.55,  making  lack  of access  to
materials  about  as binding  a  constraint  to these  latter  firms  as  was lack  of
access  to finance.
Underlying  the  high  constraint  scores  afforded  access  to  materials
by Sri  Lanka's  larger  SMEs  are  some  serious  imperfections  in  that  country's
market  for  leather:  only  3 of the  18 firms  in this  category  that  provided
information  reported  adequate  quantities  of leather  of adequate  quality  to  be
available;  the  remaining  firms  expressed  dissatisfaction  in  one  or both  of
these  dimensions.  At the  root  of this  dissatisfaction  is  a longstanding  Sri
Lankan  policy  --  even in  the  face  of a  manifest  absence  of any  comparative
advantage  in the  supply  of tanned  leather  --  of limiting  the rate  of expansion
of the footwear  and leather  products  industry  to the  rate  of expansion  of
local  tanning  capability.
Prior  to 1983,  the  policy  of promoting  upstream  suppliers  of
leather  at the  expense  of  private,  downstream  producers  of leather  products
took  the  form  of indiscriminate  support  for  the  state-owned  L'  ather
Corporation.  This  parastatal  was  afforded  preferential  access  to local  hides,
was  provided  a veto  on the  entry  of potential  private  competitors  and  was
protected  from  foreign  competition  by  means  of a bar  on imports. Further,  the- 32 -
Corporation  channelled  two-thirds  of its  production  to its  own  downstream
footwear  and leather  products  divisions,  thereby  restricting  even further  the
availability  of leather  to  private  local  users. Subsequent  to 1983,  the
restrictions  on entry  and  on access  to  hides  were liberalized.  However,  while
the  ban  on leather  was lifted,  a 602  nominal  tariff  continued  to discriminate
against  imported  leather. 27 Further,  for  all  that  since  1983  a number  of
private  entrants  have  begun  tanning  leather,  most  of the leather  tanned  in
Sri  Lanka  still  does  not find  its  way onto  the  open  market:  approximately  552
of the  production  of the  three  leading  tanners  is  transferred  to their  own
downstream  operations,  and  an additional  15-20Z  sold  on contract  to the  two
leading  private  producers  of footwear  for  the  Sri  Lankan  market;  only  25-30?
of their  output  is sold  on the  open  market  to independent  producers.
While  the  imperfections  detailed  above  clearly  are specific  to the
market  for  leather,  it is  noteworthy  that  access  to  materials  emerged  also in
Sri  Lanka's  ceramics  and  calibrated  gemstone  sectors  as among  the  leading
constraints  on SME  expansion. 28 In ceramics,  the  state-owned  Ceramics
Corporation  has  a legal  monopoly  to  mine the  requisite  inputs  for  ceramics
production  (all  available  in  abundance  in  Sri  Lanka),  and  has  used that
monopoly  to shape  the  structure  of the  industry  in favor  of large  enterprises
at the  expense  of SHEs.  In gemstone  calibration,  the  State  Gem  Corporation
27  With  a 200  percent  export  tax  on raw  hides,  the  effective  subsidy  for
tanners  is substantially  in  excess  of 60  percent.  Interestingly,
notwithstanding  the  widespread  claims  of unavailability  of leather,  none of
the  SMHs  lnterviewed  reported  that  they  used  imported  leather,  raising  the
possibility  that  there  continue  to exist  non-tariff  obsta.cles  to the
importation  of leather.
28 This  conclusion  is  a qualitative  one,  since  the  number  of SMEs
surveyed  ln the  two  sectors  was too  small  for  quantitative  constraint  scores
to be useful.- 33 -
has  been  mandated  to  control  --  via the  physical  lnspection  of the  contents  of
each  and  every  transaction  --  both  the  export  of gemstones,  and  the
importation  of  uncut  stones  from  abroad  for  calibration  in Sri  Lanka  and
subsequent  re-export. It  has  proceeded  with its  regulatory  function  in a
manner  that (paralleling  the  earlier  discussion  on the impact  of regulation  on
Tanzanian  SME9)  imposes  a disproportionately  severe  administrative  burden  for
smaller  enterprises  involved  in the  export  of  calibrated  gemstones,  especially
new entrants  that  have  not  yet learned  their  way  around. 29 While  the
materials  constraints  in  leather  products,  ceramics  and  gemstone  calibration
each have idiosyncratic,  sector-specific  features,  all  three  sectors  are
characterized  by a dominant  state-owned  enterprise  which  has shaped  industrial
organization  in  a  way that  discriminates  against  SMEs. As  will be explored
further  in the  conclusion  to this  paper,  this  common  pattern  raises  some
intriguing  questions  as to  how  privatization  might  be carried  out in
previously  state-dominated  economies  so  as to  enhance  the  opportunities  for
efficient  participation  by SMEs.
Turning  to Tanzania,  the  low  scores  for  the  obstacles  associated
with lack  of access  to  equipment,  spare  parts  and  wood signify  the  existence
of  well-functioning  input  markets  for  producers  of furniture. In the  market
for  wood, large  numbers  of indigenous  entrepreneurs  have specialized  at a
range  of levels,  with some  procuring  wood from  local  forests  via their  own
29 One  SME  exporter  whose  experience  apparently  is  not atypical  reported
that  he personally  spends  two  days  processing  the  shipment  of  an export  order,
and  three  days  processing  the  clearance  requirements  prior  to receipt  of a
parcel  of gemstones  sent  by a foreign  buyer  on a  no-foreign-exchange  basis  for
calibration  and  re-export.  In  a typical  month,  he reported,  he has  no
alternative  but to devote  fully  50Z  of  his  time  to overcoming  bureaucratic
hurdles  set  up by the  State  Gem  Corporation  and  by Customs  (which  operates  a
parallel  apparatus  to regulate  international  trade  in  gemstones).- 34 -
agents  and  then  retailing  in small  lots  to  urban  users,  and  others  coming
direct  from  the  countryside  and  wholesaling  lots  directly  to larger  urban
users. As  for  equipment  and  spare  parts,  these  are  purchased  from  traders  who
in turn  import  their  wares  from  abroad. Input  markets  did  not  operate  as  well
in  Tanzania's  construction  industry,  where lack  of access  to equipment  was
identified  as  the  non-price  constraint  that  was  most  binding  after  access  to
finance,  and  lack  of access  to building  materials  also  was reported  as a
significant  obstacle. Even  so,  it is  noteworthy  that  in the  construction  as
well as the  furniture  industries  there  was  a decline  in the  perceived  severity
of constraints  in access  to physical  inputs  between  the  time  of -- try  and  of
the  interviews. 30 One  possible  explanation  for  these  d:clines  is the  greater
availability  of imported  items  subsequent  to the  policy  reforms  initiated  in
1985.
Technical  and  marketing  constraints.  The scores  in  Table  1 for
'lack  of technical  skills',  'scarcity  of competent  workers'  and  not  enough
domestic  buyers'  are  low  for  both  Sri  Lanka  and  Tanzania,  implying  that  on
average  the  sample  SMEs  do  not  now  perceive  shortfalls  in these  areas  to  be
serious  constraints  on expansion. It is important,  however,  not  to
misinterpret  these  results:  typically,  firms  in the  sample  evaluated  the
obstacles  in relation  to the  markets  they  were serving  at the  time  of the
interviews,  and  a production  quality  that  sufficed  to  meet the  needs  of this
30 The  constraint  scores  (calculated  from  a sample  of 14 construction
firms)  for  lack  of access  to  equipment  and  lack  of access  to building
materials  as  obstacles  to expansion  were 0.71  and  0.51 respectively;  their
respective  scores  as obstacles  to  entry  were 0.94  and  0.86,  the  leading  and
second  constraints  faced  by the  14 firms  at  entry.  For  the  furniture  firms,
the  scores  for  lack  of access  to  spare  parts  and  to equipment  as constraints
on entry  were 0.49  and  0.45  respectively.- 35 -
clientele. Yet  current  practice  is  not  necessarily  a reliable  basis  for
evaluating  technical  and  marketing  constraints;  the  relevant  constraints  are
those  which  enterprises  confront  in relatively  demanding  markets. Thus
perceptions  of constraint  might  be hypothesized  to  vary according  to  both the
(market-driven)  price  and  quality  requirements  of the  speciZic  market  niches
which  enterprises  seek  to serve,  and  the (entrepreneur-driven)  ambition  and
market  awareness  of the  enterprise  proprietors.  In practice,  patterns  of
variation  emerged  most  vividly  for  the  technical  constraints,  so it is on
these  that  the  analysis  focuses.
Table  5  disaggregates  among  the  sample  according  to  enterprise
size,  entrepreneur's  education,  and  the 'quality'  of the  market  niches  that
the  enterprise  sought  to serve. Reflecting  overall  differences  between  the
two  countries  in levels  of education,  in  Tanzania  entrepreneurs  with 10  or
more  years  of schooling  were taken  to  be educated,  while  in Sri  Lanka  13  years
of schooling  served  as the  minimum  requirement.  Sri  Lankan  enterprises  '-e,e
classified  as serving  a  high  quality  niche  if they  subcontracted  to  Bata  or
the  second  large  private  producer  and  distributor  of footwear  (6  firms),  if
they  had  made some  effort  to export  (5  firms),  or if  they sold  their  products
through  established,  relatively  high  volume  and  high  quality  retail  footwear
outlets  (4  firms);31  the  remaining  22 enterprises  in the  sample  --  including  9
enterprises  with 5  or fewer  workers  that  sold  all  of tiaeir  output  directly
from  their  workshops  --  were classified  as serving  low  quality  niches. The
Tanzanian  enterprises  serving  high  quality  niches  were defined  to  be those
31 This  last  category  was defined  to  com7rise  firms  with over  15  workers
that  sold  their  products  through  retail  outlets.  Two  of the four  firms  had
multiple  retail  ou.lets  and  employed  well above  15  workers;  for  the  remaining
2 firms  the  classification  was somewhat  more arbitrary.- 36 -
TABLES 
CONSTRAINT  SCORNS  I01  LACK  OF TUICAL  SKILLS AS AN OBSTACLE
TO OM6 WARSSION  IN  SRI LANKA  AND TANZAIXA
SY SU1  OF FIRM. HAl?T  EXCEl AND DNTUFPRENIR'S EDUCATION
Number  of Employees
1 - 5  6 - 15  16  or  More  TOTAL
No.  Score  No.  Score  No.  Score  Score
A:  Sri Lanka
High  Quality
Market  Niche
Educated  Entrepreneur  0  - 3  0.52  9  0.36  0.40
Uneducated  Entrepreneur  0  - 0  - 3  0.08  0.08
Low  Quality
Market  Niche
Educated  Entrepreneur  2  0.0  1  0.0  0  - 0.0
Uneducated  Entrepreneur  12  0.04  7  0.18  0  - 0.09




Educated  Entrepreneur  0  - 3  0.39  3  0.08  0.20
Uneducated  Entrepreneur  0  - 2  0.13  2  0.13  0.13
Low  Quality
Market  Niche
Educated  Entrepreneur  2  0.0  1  0.0  0  - 0.0
Uneducated  Entrepreneur  4  0.08  1  0.0  1  0.0  0.06
6  0.06  7  (0.20)  6  (0.08)  0.11
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that  sold  furniture  to government  agencies  (10  firms)  or through  retail
outlets  that  were physically  independent  of the  workshop  (4  firms,  all  of  whom
also  sold  to  government);  the  remaining  9 (low  quality  niche)  firms  all sold
,.heir  entire  output  directly  from  their  workshops.
Consistent  with the  hypothesis  that  the  perception  of technical
constraint  is  a function  of  market-  and  entrepreneur-driven  influences,  the
data  in  Table  5 indeed  point  to systematic  variations  in  perception  of
technical  constrGint.  Moreover,  although  the  various  influences  turn  out  to
be  highly  collinear  with one  another,  there  is  some  evidence  that  each  has
some  independent  effect. Concretely,  as is  most clearly  evident  in  the  data
for  Sri  Lanka,  the  sample  enterprises  fall  overwhelmingly  into  one  of two
quite  distinct  groups:  a group  of educated  entrepreneurs  that  employ  over 5
(actually,  most over  15)  workers,  with some  involvement  in  high  quality  market
niches,  and  that  appraise  technical  constraints  as quite  significant;  and  a
group  of uneducated  entrepreneurs  with 15  or fewer  (actually,  most  5 or fewer)
employees,  no involvement  in  high  quality  market  niches,  and  no perception
that  limited  technical  capabilities  might  limit  their  expansion  efforts. As
for  evidence  of the  independent  impact  of  market-driven  and  entrepreneur-
driven  influences,  the  perception  of technical  constraint  among  the  SMEs  that
serve  high  quality  niches  is greater  for  the  educated  than  uneducated
entrepreneur;  correspondingly,  among  the  SMEs  with educated  entrepreneurs,  the
perception  of technical  constraint  is  greater  among  those  that  serve  high
rather  than low  quality  market  niches.
The  weakness  of support  systems  --  market  and  institutional
networks  (both  private  and  public)  external  to the  firm  --  via  which  SMEs- 38 -
might  learn  about  new  production  techniques  at the  frontier  of their
capabi1.ities,  and  about  the requirements  for  penetrating  new  markets
(especially  export  markets)  appears  to  be an important  reasox!  for  the
technical  constraints  reported  by educated  entrepreneurs  serving  high quality
market  niches. Only S  of 15 Sri  Lankan  leather  SMEs  serving  high  quality
niches  (and  none  of the  22 serving  low  quality  niches)  reported  that  their
enterprise  had  received  some  form  of technical  assistance  --  provided  to 3  of
the  5  by buyers,  and  to 2 by a foreign  expert  sponsored  jointly  by the  ILO  and
the  Sri  Lankan  government;  the  remaining  enterprises  reported  that  the
technical  capabilities  of their  staff  were acquired  by on the  Job learning  --
either  in  their  own  firms  or as employees  of other  enterprises.  As is
attested  by the  example  of the  only  Tanzanian  furniture  SHE  that  had  organized
its  workshop  on  a quasi-assembly  line  basis  consistent  with the  fulfillment  of
orders  for  high  volume,  technical  support  systems  appear  even  weaker  in that
nation  than  in Sri  Lanka. In an  effort  to  upgrade  its  capabilities,  and in
the  absence  of alternative  information,  the  SHE  placed  an order  for  4
woodworking  machines  with a  vernot  visiting  Tanzania  from  a little-known
foreign  company  and introduced  to the  firm  by its  bank.  In the  event,  the
enterprise  was  able  to use  only  2 of the  4  machines:  the  third  machine  (fully
paid for)  never  was  delivered;  and  with the  promiced  technical  support  for
installation  and  start-up  failing  to  materialize,  the  enterprise  found  itself
unable  to operate  the  fourth  and  most  expensive  machine.
Information  is  more  limited  as to  support  systems  for  export
marketing  insofar  as only  a small  minority  of SMEs  in  the  two  sectors  analyzed
in the  most  derth  --  two  furniture  SMEs  in Tanzania  ,  and  5 leather  product
SMEs in  Sri  Lanka  --  had  any intecest  in  export  markets. There  was  more- 39 -
export activity --  but less opportunity for data-gathering and analysis --
among  Sri  Lanka's  suppliers  of calibrated  stones  (a  sector  that  produced
almost  entirely  for  export)  and  Tanzania's  nascent  exporters  of horticultural
products. Even so,  the  sample  provides  an interesting  glimpse  of the  balance
between  public  and  private  initiatives  in  establishing  channels  for  export
(albeit  no basis  for  uncovering  what  balance  might  be efficient).
In the  leather  products  sector,  all  of the  export  channels  were
established  privately,  with the  2  most successful  channels 32 started  by
foreigners  in the  course  of  visits  to Sri  Lanka  for  reasons  that  initially  had
nothing  to  do  with export  procurement.  While  exports  of calibrated  gemstones
from  Sri  Lanka  got  underway  only  in  the  late  1970s,  exporters  were able  to
build  on  pre-existing  ties  with  buyers  who  had long  been  visiting  Sri  Lanka  to
purchase  precious,  uncut  or  partially  cut  gems.  In recent  years,  Sri  Lanka's
Export  Development  Board  has actively  sought  to  promote  participation  in the
activity,  and  apparently  has  provided  useful  support  for  new  entrants  to enter
the  business,  but there  is  insufficient  information  to evaluate  to  what degree
this  public  support  has  accelerated  the  expansion  of  exports  of calibrated
gemstones. In the  Tanzanian  wood  products  sector,  the  export  efforts  were
entirely  at the  initiative  of the  manufacturers  (both  of Indian  origin).
Tanzania's  Board  of  External  Trade  has sponsored  a  number  of visits  abroad  for
potential  horticultural  exporters,  and  has  thereby  been  a catalyst  for  at
least  some  of the  emerging  interest  in the  sector. Even so,  while  none of the
horticultural  entrepreneurs  had as  yet  established  a clear  market  presence  as
32 Both  firms  exported  more than  half  of their  total  production;  foreign
sales  amounted  to  below  five  percent  of sales  of the  remaining  3 firms  active
in  export  markets.- 40 -
exporters,  the  two  putative  exporters  whose  plans  were  most advanced  both
appear  to  have  acted  largely  on their  own  initiatives.
In all,  both the  constraint  scores  and  evidence  as to the
character  of support  systems  suggest  that  technical  (and,  by extension,
marketing)  constraints  are  rather  more restrictive  than  they  might
superficially  appear  --  the  SMEs  who gave  technical  constraints  least  weight
were those  least  aware  of the  technical  requirements  associated  with upgradirg
their  capabilities,  while  the  SMEs  with  more  awareness  weighted  them  somewhat
more  heavily.  Even  so,  as the  concluding  section  of this  paper  explores
further,  recognition  that  technical  constraints  bind  more stringently  than
might  superficially  appear  need  not  necessarily  imply  that  government  has  an
active  role  to  play  in  their  alleviation.
III:  SOME  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS
Analysis  of the  constraints  confronting  SMEs in Sri  Lanka  and
Tanzania  yields  a  range  of implications  for  policy  reform  that  are likely  also
to  be relevant  for  other  countries. Some  address  the  general  issue  of how to
go about  formulating  the  agenda  for  reform  of the  environment  in  which  SMEs  do
business. Others  address  specific  reforms  in  relation  to each  of the
individual  constraints.
111.1  Formulating  the  Agenda  for  Reform
As  the  analysis  reveals.  SMEs  operate  in a complex  environment  and
confront  a diverse  array  of constraints;  it  is chimerical  to search  for  a- 41 -
single  binding  constraint,  common  across  all  countries,  which  once  released
will set  in  motion  a rapid,  sustained  process  of SHE  development. Not  only  is
there  likely  to be substantial  variation  among  countries  --  and,  within
countries,  among  classes  of SHEs  --  as to  which  constraint  is binding,  the
release  of one  constraint  is  likely  to  bring  to  the fox.-front  some  other
constraint  whose  inhibiting  influence  had  not  previously  been  as  clearly
evident. Yet  for  all  of this  complexity,  the  analysis  has  outlined  a
methodology  for  learning  from  SMEs  themselves  what  is  the relative  impact  of
the  various  non-price  constraints,  and  detailing  how this  impact  might  vary
among  groups  of SMEs.
The  applications  of the  methodology  have  uncovered  quite  different
patterns  of SHE  constraint  in  Tanzania  and  Sri  Lanka  and,  within  Sri  Lanka,
between  the  smallest  and  least  experienced  SHEs  on the  one  hand,  and  larger
and  more established  firms  on the  other. The  evidence  seems  unambiguous  that
lack  cf access  to finance  represents  the  binding  constraint  on expansion  for
all  classes  of SHEs in  Tanzania,  as  well as for  smaller,  less  established
firms  in Sri  Lanka. Further,  this  constraint  appears  more severe  for  the
smallest  Tanzanian  SMEs  than  for  their  Sri  Lankan  counterparts:  while  formal
banks  do  not lend  to the  smallest  firms  in  either  country,  both informal
finance  and  trade  credits  appear  more readily  available  in  Sri  Lanka. In
Tanzania,  the  financing  constraint  was followed  --  again  for  all  SMEs,  but
with  a disproportionately  severe  impact  on the  smallest  --  by the  burdens  of
pervasive  and  non-transparent  tax  and  regulatory  obligations. By contrast,
the  smallest  and  least  established  Sri  Lankan  enterprises  maintained  an
informal  status  entirely  outside  the  regulatory  web, and reported  no
difficulties  with regulatory  authorities.  Neither  the  smallest  Sri  Lankan  nor- 42 -
any  of  the  Tanzanian  firmi  reported  technical,  marketing  or input  constraints
to  be significant  obstacles  to  expansion,  although  this  appears  to reflect
more the  relatively  narrow  market  they  currently  serve  and limited  information
as to the  requirements  of  more  demanding  market  segments  than  any  underlying
capabilities.
The  evidence  as to  which  constraints  are  most  binding  is  more
ambiguous  for  the larger,  established  SMEs  in Sri  Lanka. While  the financing
constraint  appears  to ease  as firms  grow,  a  host  of new  obstacles  --  no one  of
which  appears  to be dominant  --  come  to the  fore. Thus larger  Sri  Lankan  SMEs
felt  constrained  by the  limited  availability  of requisite  inputs,  vulnerable
to  the  risk  of heightened  scrutiny  by tax  and  other  government  authorities  in
the  wake  of success,  limited  by  weaknesses  in  their  technical  skills,  and  --
for  the  subsample  of enterprises  that  sought  to export  --  frustrated  by
cumbersome  bureaucratic  procedures  and  the  weakness  of institutional
mechanisms  via  which  they  might  link  to the  international  marketplace.
To be sure,  learning  which  constraints  bind  enterprises  is  only  a
first  step  in  setting  priorities  for  reform  to  promote  efficient  SME
development.  Some  constraints  may  not  be susceptible  to reform. For  others,
the  costs  of effective  reform  may  be too  high to  justify  the  resultant
benefits. Finally,  the  absence  of constraint  may  signal  some  undesirable
weaknesses  in,  say,  the  regulatory  environment.  What is  needed  is detailed
analysis  of the  prospects  for  reform  of  each  constraint,  more  detailed  than  is
possible  in the  present  paper. Nonetheless,  the  final  sections  of the  paper
draw  on the  experiences  of Sri  Lanka  and  Tanzania  to offer  some  preliminary
co  mments  as  to how  reform  might  proceed  in  each  constraint  area.- 43 -
III.2  Enhancing  Access  to  Finance
This  subsection  highlights  two  financing  issues:  the  provision  of
credit  by formal  financial  institutions;  and  the  provision  of credit  to  micro-
enterprises.
It is  difficult  to imagine  a starker  contrast  in  the  performance
of formal  financial  institutions  in the  provision  of SME  finance  than  was
evident  between  Sri  Lanka  and  Tanzania. Whereas  Sri  Lanka  by all  accounts
represents  a  model  of  what  can  be achieved  by a  well-functioning  system, 33 as
outlined  earlier  the  Tanzanian  system  appears  to be in a state  of  virtual
disintegration.  Given  the  evidence  thait  established  SMEs  rely  increasingly  on
formal  finance,  and  the  virtually  unanimous  view  of Tanzania's  SMEs  that  lack
of access  to finance  is their  leading  obstacle  to  expansion,  reform  of
Tanzania's  banking  sector  deserves  the  highest  priority.
The Sri  Lankan  success  offers  a  useful  guide  to the
characteristics  of a formal  banking  sector  that  can lend  effectively  to SMEs.
Some  are  the  increasingly  familiar  virtues  of a  well-functioning  financial
system:  competition  among  independent  banks  for  borrowers;  positive  real
interest  rates  (no  SME  credit  is  provided  at  below-market  interest  rates);
determined  efforts  at collection  of outstanding  loans  (even  with ongoing  civil
unrest,  the  recovery  rate  of Sri  Lankan  banks  for  loans  to SMEs  has  been in
33 See,  for  example,  the  recent  review  by Leila  Webster,  World  Bank
Lending  to Small  and  Medium  Enterprises:  Fifteen  Years  of Experience,  Industry
and  Energy  Department  Wcrking  Paper  Series  No. 20,  November  1989.- 44 -
the 75-901  range). But  other  characteristics  are  rather  less  consistent  with
prevailing  dogmas  of financial  sector  reform. For  one  thing,  the  bulk of SHE
lending  appears  to  have  come from  credit  provided  via  targeted,  World  Bank
supported  SML  loans;  three  loans  already  have  been  disbursed,  and  a fourth  is
in preparation.  For  another  thing,  while  both  public  and  private  institutions
participate  in  the  bank  supported  project,  by far  the  largest  lender  has  been
the  state-owned  Bank  of Ceylon,  followed  by the (also  state-owned)  People's
Bank.  Further,  although  there  is little  difference  in  the recovery  rates  of
the  public  and  private  banks, the  public  banks  have  more  aggressively  sought
out  borrowers  that  do not  ordinarily  have access  to formal  credit,  with the
private  banks  willing  to 'cream'  the  market  and  service  only  the  most
obviously  creditworthy  SME  borrowers. Finally,  the  Central  Bank  of Sri  Lanka
operates  a credit  guarantee  scheme  which  provides  partial  coverage  for  SME
lending;  while  no evaluation  of the  effectiveness  of the  scheme  is  available,
it  apparently  was  widely  used  at least  in  the  initial  years  of SME  lending.
The  Sri  Lankan  experience  suggests  that  it is  at the  very least  premature  to
conclude  that  the  solution  to the  financing  problems  of SMEs  necessarily  lies
in  the  unsupported,  market-driven  provision  of  non-targeted  credit  by
competing  private  banks.
As for  the  provision  of credit  to  micro-enterprises,  even  in Sri
Lanka  the  evidence  suggests  that  formal  lending  programs  do not reach  the
smallest  and  least  well  established  enterprises. These  are  precisely  the
enterprises  which  are  most likely  to  provide  opportunities  for  self-employment- 45 -
to the  least  weil endowed  members  of society, 34 a group  which  in Sri  Lanka
repeatedly  has expressed  its  discontent  by violently  challenging  the  state.
For reasons  both  of equity  and  of political  pragmatism,  it  might  be desirable
to  make  an added  effort  to  extend  financing  to  microenterprises.  But  it is
crucial  to recognize  that  this  task  is  distinct  from  the  task  of extending
access  to formal  finance  to S4Es,  and is  likely  to involve  a quite  different
set  of institutional  mechanisms  (for  example,  lending  to  borrower  groups).
Special  care  should  be taken  to ensure  that  efforts  to  pursue  the  task  of
poverty  alleviation  by extending  access  to finance  to  microenterprises  are  not
pursued  in a  way that  pressures  lenders  into  making  loans  they  judge  to be
unviable,  and  thereby  undermines  financial  systems  that  have  proven  themselves
effective  in the  rather  different  task  of reaching  those  SMEs  that  have  begun
to show  signs  of  maturity.
III.3  Reforming  the  Regulatory  and  Tax  Regime
Much of the  debate  on regulatory  reform  has centered  around  the
circumstances  in  which  market  failure  affords  a justification  for  regulatory
intervention.  Such  debate  offers  only  a  partial  perspective:  a  comprehensive
analysis  should  give  careful  attention  not  only  to the  social  benefits  that
regulations  are intended  to achieve,  but  also  to  the  costs  that  they  impose  on
enterprises.  Consistent  with the  overall  approach  of the  present  paper,  this
subsection  will analyze  the  implications  for  the  design  of regulatory  and tax
34 Of the  17 Sri  Lankan  entrepreneurs  sampled  with fewer  than  13  years  of
education,  with father's  that  had fewer  than  13  years  of education  and  with
only  a limited  command  of  English  (still  the  language  of  business  among  the
elite),  13  were active  in  enterprises  with 5  or fewer  workers,  and in
operation  for less  than  3  years.- 46 -
reform  of  more  careful  attention  to these  costs.
It is  by now  broadly  accepted  on a priori  grounds  that  a  well-
functioning  regulatory  and  tax  regime  should  be characterized  by a  minimum  of
bureaucratic  requirements,  and  by transparent,  moderate  obligations  imposed
across  a broad  spectrum  of enterprises.  The  empirical  analysis  uncovered  four
ways in  which  the  regulatory  and  tax  regimes  in Sri  Lanka  and  Tanzania  depart
from  the  efficient,  a  priori  model:  high formal  tax  obligations  (in  both
countries);  pervasive  lubrication  (in  Tanzania);  high  bureaucratic  costs
(especially  in  Tanzania);  and  a  pattern  of selective  enforcement  that  excludes
the  smallest  enterprises  from  the  regulatory  net (in  Sri  Lanka).
In sorting  out  the  impact  of these  distortions  on SMEs  and  what
they  imply  for  policy  reform,  it is  useful  to  distinguish  analytically  among
three  distinct  but interrelated  burdens  --  a fiscal  burden,  a bureaucratic
burden,  and  a threshold  burden. The  fiscal  burden  represents  the  disincentive
effects  of taxation  --  a  disincentive  borne  by taxpaying  firms  of all size,
and  one  which  increases  in  magnitude  as tax  rates  rise. As both the  Sri
Lankan  and  Tanzanian  experiences  reveal,  analysis  of official  tax  rules  can
provide  a  wholly  misleading  picture  of the  character  of these  obligations  --
either  because  (as  in Sri  Lanka)  tax  laws  are  not  enforced  on small
enterprises,  or because  (as  in Tanzania)  pervasive  lubrication  results  in
there  being  little  relation  between  the  formal  obligations  and  the  amount
actually  paid  by enterprises.
The  bureaucratic  burden  represents  the  costs  to SMEs  --  most
importantly  the  opportunity  cost  of the  entrepreneur's  time  --  of dealing  with- 47 -
the  various  agencies  of government,  with the  magnitude  of the  burden  inversely
proportional  to the  efficiency  with  which  the  government  agencies  carry  out
their  assigned  tasks. Since  presumably  governments  do not impose  bureaucratic
tasks  simply  for  the  perverse  pleasure  of tormenting  entrepreneurs,  the
bureaucratic  burden  is  produced  jointly  with the  fiscal  burden  --  or jointly
with the  performance  of some  other  task  aside  from  tax  collection  that
government  has taken  upon itself. Unlike  the  fiscal  burden,  the  bureaucratic
burden  is likely  to  be disproportionately  large  for  the  smallest  enterprises  -
- in part  because  it is in  the  nature  of a fixed  cost  which  is  more or less
invariant  with firm  size,  and in  part  because  large  but  not small  enterprises
can  hire  managers  to  whom to  delegate  many  of their  dealings  with government
officials. The  empirical  analysis  suggests  that  the  bureaucratic  burden  is
larger  for  Tanzanian  firms  than  for  their  Sri  Lankan  counterparts  --  both
because  the  bureaucracy  may simply  be less  efficient  in Tanzania,  and  because
the  Tanzanian  but  not Sri  Lankan  authorities  have  extended  their  bureaucratic
net  to include  even  the  smiallest  firms.
T mhe threshold  burden  represents  a discontinuity  in the  structure
of  costs  that results  from  the  imposition  of some  tax-related  fiscal  burden  or
tax-or-regulatory  related  bureaucratic  burden  only  on firms  larger  than  some
minimum  threshold  size. Depending  on its  magnitude,  this  discontinuity  can
lead  some  firms  to rein  in  expansion  --  or  alternatively  to expand  via the
socially  inefficient  route  of horizontal  multiplication  of quasi-independent
enterprises,  all  of  which  remain  smaller  than  the  threshold  at  which the  tax
and  regulatory  requirements  are  imposed. The  magnitude  of the  discontinuity
in  costs  varies  with the  magnitude  of the  fiscal  or  bureaucratic  burden
imposed  by the  tax  or regulation,  'while  the  firm  size  at  which  the  threshold- 48 -
is reached  varies  according  to  how far  short  of universal  is  the
implementation  of the  regulatory  requirements.  As the  empirical  analysis
reveals,  the  threshold  burden  appears  to deter  expansion  in Sri  Lanka  where
regulations  are  applied  only  to larger  firms,  but  not in  Tanzania  where
application  is  universal.
Paradoxically,  interactions  among  the  fiscal,  bureaucratic  and
threshold  burdens  can  have  the  effect  of offsetting  the  most egregiously
harmful  effects  of an inefficient  regulatory  regime;  so  partial  reform  can
have  the  unintended  effect  of  worsening  the  regulatory  environment  for  SMEs
relative  to the  status  quo.  Thus,  in  circumstances  such  as Tanzania's  where
an  excessive  fiscal  burden  is  offset  by pervasive,  bureaucratically  costly  (as
measured  by the  opportunity  cost  of  entrepreneur's  time)  lubrication,  it is
entirely  plausible  that  the  environment  for  SMEs  would  be  worsened  by the
imposition  of  measures  that  aought  only  to reduce  the  bureaucratic  burden  by
making  regulatory  and  tax  enforcement  entirely  transparent,  and  thereby
exposed  SMEs  to the  obligation  to  pay their  currently  exorbitant  tax
obligations  in full. Conversely,  efforts  in  Sri  Lanka  to secure  universal
coverage  of the  prevailing  regulatory  and tax  regime  would  eliminate  the
threshold  burden,  but replace  it instead  with a  new bureaucratic  and  fiscal
burden  for  the  smallest  enterprises.
Given  these  interactions,  regulatory  and  tax  reform  needs  to
proceed  simultaneously  on four  fronts. First,  the  prevailing  web of
regulations  should  be scrutinized,  and  those  that  serve  no social  purpose
eliminated  entirely  (this  scrutiny  is likely  to yield  more opportunities  for
streamlining  in  Tanzania  than  in Sri  Lanka). Second,  where (as  in  both Sri- 49  -
Lanka  and  Tanzania)  formal  tea  obligations  are  too  high  they  need  to be
reduced. Third,  in  parallel  with the  reduction  in formal  tax  obligations,
measures  should  be taken  to secure  increased  transparency  of the regulatory
and  bureaucratic  apparatus,  thereby  both reducing  the  bureaucratic  burden,  and
increasing  the  likelihood  that  enterprises  pay  all  rather  than  only  a fraction
of the  taxes  they  are  owed (reform  along  these  lines  is especially  relevant
for  Tanzania). Fourth,  in  parallel  with fiscal  and  bureaucratic  reform,
decisions  need to  be taken  as to the  appropriate  reach  of  coverage  of tax  and
regulatory  obligations.
How  universal  should  coverage  be?  One  superficially  appealing,  but
ultimately  unsustainable,  argument  is that  coverage  should  be  wholly  universal
as a  way of eliminating  the  threshold  burden. It is  true  that  universal
coverage  would  eliminate  an important  disincentive  to the  growth  of those
enterprises  that  hitherto  had  sheltered  below  the  enforcement  threshold. But
this  would  be achieved  not  by removing  some  underlying  obstacle,  but  by
transforming  the  obstacle  from  one  which  inhibits  expansion  into  one  which
inhibits  entry,  with equally  pernicious  --  if  less  visible  --  effects. A more
persuasive  argument  for  universal  coverage  (especially  of tax  obligations)  is
that  it  would  broaden  the  revenue  base,  and  thereby  permit  lower  tax  rates  and
less  disincentive  to  growth  by taxpaying  enterprises.  To be sure,  universal
coverage  would impose  a new,  expansion-inhibiting  fiscal  burden  on smaller,
previously  untaxed  enterprises.  However,  some  such  inhibition  is inherent  to
all  revenue-based  tax  systems;  moreover  (unlike  the  bureaucratic  burden),  with
proportional  or progressive  taxes  the  fiscal  burden  is  no greater  for  small
enterprises  than  it is  for  their  larger  counterparts.  Set  against  this  last
argument  for  universal  coverage  is  the  fact  that  any  new fiscal  burden- 50 -
necessarily  is  associated  with  a  corresponding  bureaucratic  burden.
Increasing  the  extent  of  coverage  not  only  increases  the  number  of  enterprises
exposed  to  the  bureaucratic  burden,  it  extends  the  bureaucratic  burden  to
smaller  and  smaller  firms  --  precisely  those  firms  for  whom (as  the  Tanzanian
experience  exemplifies)  the  effects  are  most  harmful.
Two  implications  follow  from  these  competing  arguments  as to  the
appropriate  extent  of  coverage.  The  first  implication  is  that  the  case  for
extending  the  reach  of  the  regulatory  net  to  encompass  all  enterprises  is
unambiguous  only  given  ths  empirically  implausible  assumption  that  bureaucracy
operates  entirely  frictionlessly.  Put  differently,  the  implication  is  that
the  existence  of  a  group  of  firms  excluded  from  the  reach  of  regulation  need
not  only  be  a symptom  of  some  underlying  policy  distortion  (the  usual
rationale  for  the  existence  of  the  so-called  'informal  sector').  It  may  also
sigiify  a  wise  recognition  that  the  imposition  of  regulatory  requirements  on
enterprises  inevitably  has  some  cost,  a  cost  that  falls  disproportionately  on
the  smallest  enterprises.  The  second  implication  is  that  there  is  no  single
optimal  firm  size,  identical  across  counitries,  below  which  tax  and  regulatory
obligations  should  be  excused,  with  firms  permitted  to  operate  informally.
Rather,  the  reach  of  the  regulatory  net  should  vary  with  the  administrative
capabilities  of  individual  countries.  Since  large  enterprises  are  better
placed  to  offset  the  costs  of  a  cumbersome  bureaucracy,  the  weaker  is  a
country's  administrative  capability,  the  narrower  should  be  the  reach  of  a
country's  tax  and  regulatory  apparatus.
Concretely,  in  both  Sri  Lanka  and  Tanzania  the  first  task  for
regulatory  reform  is  to  eliminate  regulations  now  in  effect  that  serve  no- 51 -
useful  social  purpose. Once this  tatk  has  been  achieved,  the  agendas  for
regulatory  and  tax  reform  are  entirely  different  in the  two  countries. In
Tanzania,  the  bureaucratic  burden  represents  the  primary  regulatory  constraint
on SME  development. Thus  the  priority  for  reform  should  be to  eliminate  the
bureaucratic  and  fiscal  burdens  on the  smallest  enterprises  by exempting  them
entirely  from  regulatory  and  tax  obligations.  As a secondary  measure,  the
bureaucratic  burden  on firms  that  remain  within  the  regulatory  and  tax  net
should  be reduced  by the introduction  of more  transparent  administrative
procedures;  even  with lower  tax  rates,  this last  measure  could  lead  to a
somewhat  larger  fiscal  burden  for  taxpaying  firms. In Sri  Lanka,  by contrast,
the  primary  regulatory  constraint  on SME  development  is the  threshold  burden
that  results  from  high regulatory  and  tax  obstacles  enforced  only  on a subset
of larger  firms. So in  that  country  the  priority  should  be to reduce  taxes
and  the  associated  fiscal  burden  on large  enterprises,  and  thereby  to reduce
the  disincentives  that  inhibit  firms  from  growing  into  formal  status. To
maintain  the  level  of tax  revenues,  this  reduction  needs  to  be accompanied  by
a broadening  of the  reach  of the  tax  and  regulatory  apparatus  relative  to the
status  quo,  thereby  imposing  new  fiscal  and  bureaucratic  burdens  on some  SMEs
that  hitherto  had effectively  been  outside  the  administrative  net.  Even
subsequent  to reform,  the  smallest  Sri  Lankan  firms  should  continue  to remain
outside  the  reach  of the  regulatory  and  tax  net.  Note,  though,  that insofar
as (as  the  empirical  analysis  implies)  Tanzania's  bureaucracy  is less
efficient  than  Sri  Lanka's,  the  reach  of the  regulatory  and tax  apparatus
should  extend  to smaller  enterprises  in Sri  Lanka  than  in  Tanzania  --
precisely  the  reverse  of  what 1s  now the  case.- 52  -
III4 Enhancing  Access  to Ncni-financial  Inputs
This  final  subsection  will consider  the  implications  of the
empirical  analysis  f..r  reforms  to  enhance  access  to physical  inputs  into
production,  a*d  to technical  and  marketing  support  services.
To begin  with access  to  physical  inputs,  the  empirical  analysis
uncovered  significant  difficulties  on the  part  of Sri  Lankan  SHEs  in gaining
access  to  physical  inputs  in  all  three  of the  leather  product,  ceramics,  and
gemstone  calibration  subsectors.  With foreign  exchange  freely  available  and
no other  policy-induced  rationing  in evidence,  these  difficulties  might
straightforwardly  be attributed  to idiosyncratic  features  of individual
subsectors.  However,  as  noted  earlier  all  three  sectors  are  characterized  by
a  dominant  state-owned  enterprise  which  has  directly  or indirectly  promoted
the  emergence  of large-scale,  vertically  integrated  operations,  and  thereby
shaped  industrial  organization  in  a  way that  discriminates  against  SMEs.
Given  the  priority  currently  being  given  to  privatization  in Sri  Lanka  and
elsewhere,  the  question  arises  as to  whether  privatization  efforts  can  perhaps
be carried  out in  a  way that  redresses  the  bias  agsinst  SMEs.
The  promc  ion  of  product  competition  --  via imports,  private
done.  1c  competitors  or even  sometimes  the  break-up  of state-owned  enterprises
into  independent  competing  units  --  has long  been  a preoccupation  of efforts
at  privatization.  Rather  less  attention  has  been  paid,  however,  to the  ways
in  which  vertical  integration  might  inhibit  competition  and  SME  participation,
and  thus  to  how  privatization  might  be undertaken  in a  way that  secures  a
vertical  restructuring  of the  industry,  one  that  substitutes  more-or-less  arms- 53 -
length  transactions  for  hierarchical  relationships  within  vertically
integrated  firms. To be sure,  vertically  integrated  ties  established  to take
advantage  of transactional  or technological  efficiencies  of integration  or to
capture  eccnomies  of scope  should  not  be disrupted. But  there  is  no reason  to
maintain  vertical  integration  that  emerged  arbitrarily  as a result  of the
decisions  of state-owned  entities,  and  that  inhibits  the  participation  of
SMEs,  even  though  it  need  not  be significantly  less  efficient  than  arms
length  arrangements,  and  thus  would  not  necessarily  disintegrate  under  the
pressure  of market  competition. 35 The  task  for  reform  in  this  area  -- one
which  in  the  present  context  can  only  be identified  --  is to distinguish  among
those  sectors  where  state-owned  enterprises  should  be privatized  as  vertically
integrated  entities,  and  those  where  there  might  be grounds  for  breaking  up
the  vertical  structure  into  its  component  parts.
Finally,  there  is the  question  of  what  might  be done  to strengthen
technical  and  marketing  support  systems  for  SMEs. The  central  policy  issue
here  concerns  the  appropriate  balance  between  public  and  private  mechanisms
for  strengthening  support. One  possibility  is that  the  development  of support
systems  is endogenous  --  that  the  weakness  of these  systems  in Sri  Lanka  and
Tanzania  is a reflection,  rather  than  underlying  cause,  of the  rather  simple
market  niches  in  which  SMEs  are  active  and  that  there  will  be spontaneous
increases  in the  private  provision  of technical  and  marketing  support  as SMEs
respond  to  new  opportunities  created  by policy  reform  and  take  on  more
35 Brian  Levy 'Transactions  Costs,  the  Size  of Firms  and  Industrial
Policy'  Journal  of Development  Economics,  forthcoming  1990,  and  'Strategic
Orientations  of Firms  and  the  Performance  of Korea  and  Taiwan  in Frontier
Industries'  World  Development,  forthcoming,  1991,  details  how the  Korean  and
Taiwanese  footwear  and  computer  industries  are  characterized  by entirely
different  patterns  of vertical  integration.- 54  -
demanding  challenges.  An alternative  possibility  is  that  the  weakness  of
support  systems  signals  some  underlying  market  failure, 36 and  thus  represents
an  exogenous  constraint  on SHE  development,  one  that  can  be overcome  on.y  via
government  intervention  of one  kind  or another. Only  careful  empirical
analysis  of successful  experiences  of SHE  and  support  system  development  can
reveal  which  of these  competing  alternatives  is  closer  to the  truth. And
since  Tanzania  and  Sri  Lanka  hardly  qualify  as successes,  that  analysis  must
necessarily  be the subject  of another  study.
36 The  putative  market  failure  could  plausibly  be traced  to the  public
good  character  of technical  and  marketing  information,  and  its  consequent
undersupply  by private  providers;  the  case  for  direct  or indirect  government
support  follows  straightforwardly.  Alternatively,  the  market  failure  could  be
traced  to  co-ordination  problems  that  undermine  the  incentive  to  be the  first
entrant  in  circumstances  where  participation  on one  side  of  a market  creates
positive  externalities  for  participants  on the  other  side;  the  latter  argument
implies  that  the  appropriate  role  for  government  is  as a ca-alyst  that,  by
providing  the  initial  stimulus,  sets  in  motion  a self-sustaining  process  of
private  *ndogenous  expansion  by SMEs and  their  related  support  systems.- 55  -
Anne.-  A
OUESTIONNAIRE  FOR INTERVIEWS  WITH LEATHER SMES IN SRI LANKA
I:  OVERVIEW
1.  Enterprise/entrepreneur name:
2.  Year of  start-up:  _
3.  Number of employees:  Current:  _
Start-up:  _
Peak (year):  ____
4.  Employment History of entrepreneur  prior to starting enterprise:
II.  MARKETS AND MARKETING
A:  Markets
1.  Items produced
(list  leadi.  g items)
2.  What was the largest order for a single item you have received in the
last 12 months?  [state item and order]
3.  What was the value of sales in the past 12 months?
4.  What percentage of total sales were exports?- 56  -
S.  What were  your  main  export  items? 
6.  In  what  year  did  you  commence  exporting?
D1  lzort  Marketins  (if  positive  exports)
1.  Through  which  of the  following  channels  have  you sold  your  products  in
the  export  market?
Currcnt  At #tart-uD
1)  Foreign  buyer  YES  NO  YES  NO
2) Sri  Lankan  export  agent  YES  NO  YES  NO
3)  Foreign  partner  YES  NO  YES  NO
2.  What  was  your first  channel  for  exports?  Explain  how  the  contact  was
established
3.  For  your  leading  buyer  of exports:
1)  give  name
2) 2  of total  exports
3) duration  of tie  (number  of  yoars)
4)  how  was  channel  established?  (if  different  from  2 above)
C:  Domestic  Marketing
1.  Through  which  of the  following  channels  have  you sold  your  products  in
the  local  market?
Current  At start-up
1) Direct  to final  consumer:  YES  NO  YES  NO
2)  To trader  YES  NO  YES  NO
3)  To retail  outlet  YES  No  YES  NO
4)  Others  specify  YES  NO  YES  NO
2.  What  percentage  of  total  dometic  sales  was made through  each  of the
sources  Identified  in Is- 57 -




III:  INVESTMENT  AND  TECHNICAL  CAPABILITY
1.  (Brief  description  of enterprise  buildings lsise  permanence,
durabilityq,  construction  materilsl,  *tc  l..
2.  What  vere  your  major  investments  in  capital  equipment?  (detail
pieces)
3.  What  vould  be the  approximate  cost  today  of setting  up your  opcration  as
it is  nov? (replacement  cost  of  assets...
4.  Hov  many employees  have  specalized skilllc7  (det-il  these  skills)
S.  How  vere  theme  specilizedso*kills  acqulrct?
1)  tcchnic_l  training  YES  NO
2) on the  job  in  firm  YES  NO
3) on the  job  *ls_whorc  YES  NO
6.  or  vhich  of tho  followo  ng  hf  your  enterprise  rbie,vpe  technical
assitance?
Management  YES  NO
productron  tochnmques  YES  NO
product  artson  YES  NO
mtrket  rng  YES  NO
2.  For  ahich  of thefh  yfe,  vho provuren  the  technical  *sltance?- 58 -
(specify)  Skill  Area  1i  Skill  Area  2:
Govt.  Agency  YES  NO  YES  NO
Foreign  Donor YES  NO  YES  NO
Non Government  YES  NO  YES  NO
Organization
Private  YES  NO  YES  NO
IV:  Input  Procurement
l.  Prom  which  of the  following  suppliers  do  you  procure
leather?
1)  state  tannery  YES  NO
2) private  tannery  YES  NO
3)  wholesaler  YES  NO
4) other  (specify)  YES  NO
2.  Do you  do any  leather  tanning  yourself?  YES  NO
If yes,  why?
3.  Are  you  able  to  purchase  as  much leather  as you  would  like?
YES  NO
If not,  why  not?
4.  Have  there  been  problems  in the  quality  of leather  you  purchase?
YES  NO
If yes,  detail






TOTAL  100l- 59  -
Vs  Financing
1.  Which  of the  following  have  been  major  sources  of finance?
(a)  Current  (b)  At start-up
1)  Ovn  savings  YES  NO  YES  NO
2)  Other  family  member  or friends  YES  NO  YES  NO
3)  Partners  YES  NO  YES  NO
4)  Informal  curb  market  YES  NO  YES  NO
5)  Formal  financial  institution  YES  NO  YES  NO
6) Suppliers  Credits  YES  NO  YES  NO
7)  Buyer's  Advance  Payment  YES  NO  YES  NO
8)  Export  preshipment  finance  YES  NO  YES  NO
9)  Other (details)  YES  NO  YES  NO
2.  What is the  value  of your  loans  from  banks:
(a)  Investment  loan
(b)  Working  capital/overdraft  facility
3.  How  much of  your  own  funds  have  you invested  in the  enterprise?
4.  What percentage  of total  financing  was  provided  by each  of the
sources  identified  in 1:




5.  If  you  have received  a comoercial  loan:
(a)  From  vhich  institutions(s)?- 60  -
For  each  institution
(a)  In  vhat year  did  you receive  your  first  loan?
(b)  How long  did  the  application  procedure  take
from  initiation  to eventual  approval?
(c)  Was  collatoral  required? Detailcs
(d)  What  other  difficulties  have  you  experienced  in  your  r lations
with  the  bank?  (details)
Vt  REGULATORY  EHVIRONMENT
1.  What is  your legal  status?  (select  one)
(a)  Unregistered
(b) Registered  as  a sole  proprietership/partnership
(c)  Incorporated  as a  Limited  Liability  privato  company
(d)  Incorporated  as  a  public  company
2.  In  what year  did  you
(a)  Register  as sole  proprietership
(b)  Incorporate  as  limited  liability  company
(c)  Incorporate  as  public  company
3.  What  problems  might  you  have  if  you  altered  your  legal  status?  (Why do
you  prefer  your  present  status?)
4.  Are  infrastructural  weaknesses  a  major  constraint  on growth?
YES  NO
If  yes,  give  details  (road,  coounications,  power)- 61 -
S,  Nov would  you  describe  your  relationship  with  each of  the  followins
gover  ment authoritiest  (pick  one)
Turnover  tax  authorities  EAMT  NWODRAT  DIPICULT
Income  tax  authorities  AST  MODERATE DInICULT
Labor  department  EASY  NODERATE  DIF"ICULT
Customs  (if  applicable)  ZASY  MODERATS  DIFFICULT
Power  Authority  (if  app)  LAST  MODERATE  DIF"ICULT
Telephone  Authority  (if  ap)WAST  MODERATE DIF"ICULT
Any  other  regulatory  2ASY  MODERATE DIFFICULT
authority  with  which  you
havo  problems  (specify)
6.  For  those  authorities  for  vhich  the  relationship  is  'difficult',
describe  the  problem  you  encounters
7.  Are  you  eligible  for  export/investment  incentives?
YES  NO
S.  If  yes,
(a)  what incentives  have  you  received:
(b)  what  difficulties  have  you  had in  using  these  incentives?
VI:  LONG-TERM  OBJECTIVES
1.  What size  of  business  would  you like  to  have  two  years  from  now?
(Circle  one).
MORE  THAN  TWICE PRESENT  SIZE  50S  LARGER  SANE  SMALLIR
2.  If  you  plan  to  expand,  what steps  have  you  taken  for  achieving  your
objective?
3.  If  you  plan  to  expand,  ean  you  raiso  additional  finance?  explain- 62  -
VII:  ORDINAL  RANKINGS
At  Obstacles  to exgansion
On a  scale  of 1 (lowest)  to 5 (highest),  vhich  of the  following  are  the
moot important  obstacles  to expanding  your  operation?
Insalnificant  SOD  Strongt
(a)  not  enough  domestic  buyers  1  2  3  4  5
(b)  not  enough  export  orders  1  2  3  4  5
(if  trying  to  export)
(c)  Lack of technical  skills  1  2  3  4  5
(d)  Scarcity  of competent  workers  1  2  3  4  5
(e)  potential  changes  in tax  status  1  2  3  4  5
(f)  labor  regulations  1  2  3  4  5
(g)  bureaucratic  procedures  1  2  3  4  5
(h)  infrastructural  weaknesses  1  2  3  4  5
(1) Lack  of access  to finance  1  2  3  4  5
(j)  High  cost  of finance  1  2  3  4  5
(k)  Lack  of acceas  to raw  materials  1  2  3  4  5
(1)  High  cost  of raw  materials  1  2  3  4  5
(m)  High  cost  of equipment  1  2  3  4  5
(n)  Political/policy  uncertainty  1  2  3  4  5
VIII:  HISTORY  OF ENTREPRENEUR
1.  Age  s
2.  Years  of formal  education:
(If  college,  specify  degree)  _
3.  Language  of schooling:
4.  Father's  primary  occupation:
S.  Father's  years  of formal  education:
6.  Language  at  home:PRE  Workdg  Poor  Serbes
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